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Abstract 
 
This article argues for a constitutional right to counsel for state inmates 
in all initial federal habeas corpus proceedings based on access-to-the-
courts doctrine.  The doctrine guarantees an indigent inmate a constitutional 
right to meaningful access to the courts in incarceration-related litigation, 
including postconviction proceedings.  The Supreme Court initially 
articulated the access right, in relevant part, as merely prohibiting states 
from actively interfering with an indigent inmate’s efforts at pursuing 
postconviction relief from a criminal judgment.  Today, though still fairly 
inscrutable in dimension, the access right has evolved to require states in 
certain circumstances to provide affirmative assistance to inmates to ensure 
constitutionally adequate access to the writ.   
In Pennsylvania v. Finley1 and Murray v. Giarratano,2 a pair of 
decisions rendered in 1987 and 1989, respectively, the Supreme Court held 
that the right of access does not require assistance of counsel in either 
noncapital or capital state postconviction proceedings, at least insofar as the 
inmate seeks to raise claims litigated on direct appeal.  The primary 
rationale in Finley and Murray was that habeas litigants have enjoyed 
assistance of counsel at trial and on direct appeal, and thus should be able 
                                                
1 481 U.S. 551, 559 (1987). 
2 492 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1989). 
 simply to parrot that work product in the federal habeas forum to obtain 
judicial review of any cognizable claims.   The Court analogized to an 
earlier case, Ross v. Moffitt,3 in which it had held no right to counsel 
attaches in discretionary appeals.  The Court has never addressed the issue 
whether the access right demands assistance of counsel in federal habeas 
proceedings.  But the lack of such right appeared a foregone conclusion 
after Finley and Giarratano. 
On April 24, 1996, however, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which introduced a 
myriad of exceedingly complex procedural requirements -- most 
significantly, a one-year statute of limitations -- that a petitioner must 
satisfy in order to obtain merits review of claims set forth in a federal 
habeas petition.  For the prototypical pro se habeas litigant, these 
requirements, in particular the statute of limitations, erected an impenetrable 
wall around federal judicial review of merits claims.  Indeed, the effect of 
AEDPA’s enactment has been to stymie many pro se inmates’ efforts at 
obtaining federal habeas review of state court judgments.  Yet, to date, the 
Supreme Court has not recognized a right to counsel in federal habeas 
corpus.  Federal courts, while struggling mightily to make sense of a poorly 
drafted statute, continue to abide by a literal fiction in assuming that most 
inmates are sufficiently competent to navigate post-AEDPA federal habeas 
practice without assistance of counsel. 
This article argues that absent constitutionally guaranteed assistance of 
counsel in federal habeas corpus and a concomitant remedy where that 
assistance falls short, AEDPA’s procedural intricacies function to deny the 
indigent, pro se state inmate the right to meaningful access to the courts in 
federal habeas proceedings.  As such, absent repeal of AEDPA, the access 
right requires recognition of a right to assistance of counsel in filing a first 
federal petition.  This right would extend only to navigating and 
comprehending the procedural complexity of federal habeas under AEDPA, 
rather than to the articulation and framing of substantive claims and 
subsequent litigation. 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
The impetus for this article derives from my work as a staff attorney 
with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, where I was responsible for 
reviewing requests for certificates of appealability, which are required by 
statute in order to appeal district court denials of federal habeas petitions, 
and making recommendations to motions panels regarding whether the 
certificates should issue.  This work required my review of federal petitions 
and the district court rulings.  In the more than four years I spent at the 
court, I reviewed and presented to motions panels over eight hundred 
petitions.  Virtually all of these petitions were prepared pro se, often 
handwritten on court-issued forms or typed out on old typewriters.  As a 
                                                
3 417 U.S. 600 (1974). 
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lawyer with substantial experience in the federal criminal justice system,4 
by far the most challenging issues for me to unpack were procedural in 
nature.  Difficulties frequently emerged from the thin language of AEDPA 
and the number of unresolved questions that have resulted.  Typically, once 
– or rather, if – the litigant cleared the procedural hurdles, the appropriate 
disposition of the merits of a particular petition became readily apparent.  
                                                
4 Prior to working at the Ninth Circuit, I spent a year clerking on that court, two years as an Attorney-
Advisor at the Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, where I provided legal advice to the 
Executive Branch primarily on criminal procedure issues, and five years as a trial and appellate lawyer with the 
Federal Public Defender’s Office in Los Angeles. 
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Throughout this work, I never ceased to be astonished by the legal 
expectation, grounded in the absence of a recognized right to counsel in 
federal habeas corpus proceedings, that inmates navigate AEDPA’s 
complexity successfully in order to obtain judicial review of the merits of 
their claims.  In the trial context, the Supreme Court has recognized that 
“[w]hile a criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are expected 
to enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice of 
unarmed prisoners to gladiators.”5  What I witnessed in federal habeas 
practice for noncapital, pro se litigants is precisely such a slaughter.   
Indeed, statistics bear out my experience.  A recent study conducted by 
Vanderbilt Law School found that over ninety percent of non-capital habeas 
cases involve pro se litigants.  Moreover, district courts dismiss as untimely 
more than one in five non-capital cases, the vast majority of which are 
uncounseled.  In practice, without assistance of counsel, AEDPA has 
shrouded the Great Writ in an impenetrable fog, leaving merits review of 
claims that a state inmate raises in a federal petition to little more than the 
fortuity of access to a competent jailhouse lawyer. 
The instant article argues that AEDPA’s procedural intricacies, coupled 
with a lack of a constitutional right to assistance of counsel, function to 
deny the indigent, pro se state inmate the right to meaningful access to the 
courts in pursuit of the Great Writ.  As such, absent repeal of AEDPA, the 
access right should require recognition of a right to assistance of counsel for 
state inmates in filing a first federal petition.  Because a right to counsel 
requires effective assistance of counsel, petitioners would have a meaningful 
remedy should counsel be unavailable or render ineffective assistance in 
apprehending the procedural strictures of the AEDPA.  In this way, we can 
begin to clear a path through AEDPA’s procedural thicket for the indigent 
habeas petitioner and ensure the constitutional guarantee of meaningful 
access to judicial review.   
In practical consequence, the proposal is a radical one.  States have 
fallen far short in realizing Gideon v. Wainright’s6 decades-old promise of a 
right to counsel at trial.7  Thus, to imagine a right to counsel in federal 
habeas may seem both decadent and unrealistic.  But it is precisely because 
Gideon’s dream has not fully materialized that habeas corpus occupies such 
a crucial role in our criminal justice system.  Without an effective, 
accessible habeas writ, inmates who suffer at the hands of incompetent trial 
or appellate counsel are at best, lost to the system; at worst, they lose their 
lives.  Beyond the personal cost to those directly affected, we, as a society, 
are left with the stain of that injustice.  
                                                
5 United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657 (1984) (internal quotation omitted) (reversing Tenth Circuit’s 
presumption of ineffectiveness where young and inexperienced trial counsel had only 25 days to prepare complex, 
serious case and some witnesses were not easily accessible). 
6 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
7 See Bruce R. Jacob, Memories of and Reflections About Gideon v. Wainwright, 33 STETSON L. REV. 181, 
282 (2003); Christopher N. Lasch, The Future of Teague Retroactivity, or “Redressability,” After Danforth v. 
Minnesota: Why Lower Courts Should Give Retroactive Effect to New Constitutional Rules of Criminal Procedure 
in Postconviction Proceedings, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2009). 
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This Article is structured as follows:  Part I identifies the problem, i.e., 
the lack of a constitutional right to counsel in federal habeas corpus and the 
near impenetrability of post-AEDPA federal habeas practice for pro se 
litigants.  Part II sets forth the access-to-the-courts doctrine as a framework 
for recognition of a constitutional right to counsel in federal habeas.  Part III 
applies the access doctrine to AEDPA, arguing that the right to meaningful 
access demands assistance of counsel in navigating AEDPA’s procedural 
thicket.  Lastly, Part IV explores different models for implementation of an 
access-based right to counsel in federal habeas corpus.  
 
I.  THE PROBLEM:  THE IMPOSSIBLE TASK OF NAVIGATING AEDPA’S 
PROCEDURAL MORASS WITHOUT ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
 
A. The Lack of a Recognized Constitutional Right to Counsel in Federal 
Habeas Proceedings. 
 
To date, the Supreme Court has only recognized a constitutional right to 
counsel for the criminally accused at trial8 and on the first direct appeal of 
right.9  This right extends to all felony defendants as well as misdemeanor 
defendants who face a potential loss of life or liberty.10  Moreover, the right 
to counsel at trial extends to all “‘critical’ stages of the proceedings” against 
the defendant, and not merely to the trial itself.11  But the Court has 
declined to recognize a constitutional right to counsel in seeking 
discretionary review before a state’s Supreme Court or in filing a petition 
for writ of certiorari before the U.S. Supreme Court.12 
Thus far, the Supreme Court has also declined to recognize a 
constitutional right to counsel in state postconviction proceedings, at least 
insofar as the petitioner seeks to raise claims previously litigated at trial or 
on appeal.13  As I will discuss in greater depth in Part II, infra, in 
Pennsylvania v. Finley, decided in 1987, the Court rejected a claim that the 
constitutional right to meaningful access to the courts requires assistance of 
                                                
8 See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (recognizing Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel 
for capital defendants); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (recognizing Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
for federal criminal defendants facing loss of life or liberty); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (extending 
Powell to noncapital criminal defendants). 
9 See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356-68 (1963) (recognizing due process and equal protection 
right to counsel on first appeal). 
10 See Jacob, supra note 6; Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979) (finding that whether an indigent 
defendant has the right to appointment of counsel under Gideon depends on the ultimate sanction imposed); 
Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 743 n.9 (1994) (noting in dicta that, for felony cases, the right to counsel 
does not depend on potential incarceration); Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 654 (2002) (recognizing right to 
counsel in misdemeanor cases even where sentencing court suspends a prison or jail sentence and imposes 
probation). 
11 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224-25 (1967) (concluding that post-indictment lineup is critical 
stage of prosecution and thus, right to counsel attaches).  See also United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 192-93 
(1984) (holding right to counsel attaches at preliminary hearing and arraignment only if certain rights are at risk 
but unconditionally at sentencing). 
12 Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 601-02 (1974) (concluding due process and equal protection interests 
underlying right to counsel on direct appeal do not extend to discretionary review by state’s high court).  
13 See Emily Garcia Uhrig, A Case for a Constitutional Right to Counsel in Habeas Corpus, 60 HASTINGS 
L.J. 541 (2009) (arguing for a right to counsel in habeas corpus for claims unique to habeas proceedings, for 
which the petitioner has not yet had assistance of counsel).   
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counsel in state, non-capital habeas proceedings.14  Rather, the Court held 
that a pro se inmate’s access to the trial record and the appellate briefs and 
opinions suffice to provide meaningful access to the courts for 
postconviction litigation.15  Thus, as with discretionary appeals, no 
constitutional right to counsel attaches during state postconviction 
proceedings.16 
Two years later, in Murray v. Giarratano, a plurality of the Court 
affirmed Finley and held, in relevant part, that the constitutional guarantee 
of meaningful access to the courts also does not require assistance of 
counsel during state postconviction proceedings involving capital 
defendants.17  Specifically, in Murray, Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices 
White, O’Connor, and Scalia, rejected the argument by Virginia death row 
inmates that assistance of counsel was necessary in order to ensure their 
constitutional right of access to the courts in state habeas proceedings, as 
guaranteed by Bounds v. Smith.18  Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice 
O’Connor, concurred in the judgment, but noted that “[t]he complexity of 
[Supreme Court] jurisprudence in this area . . . makes it unlikely that capital 
defendants will be able to file successful petitions for collateral relief 
without the assistance of persons learned in the law.”19  Nonetheless, he 
agreed petitioners had failed to state a claim for relief because, to date, no 
capital petitioner in Virginia had been unable to obtain counsel to assist in 
habeas proceedings and state prisons had staff attorneys to assist inmates 
with preparing their petitions.20   
Seven years later, in Lewis v. Casey, the Court modified its holding in 
Bounds to make clear that the access right does not encompass assistance 
with investigating claims and litigating them effectively.21  Rather, the right 
encompasses only assistance in getting through the courthouse doors, as 
opposed to a right to substantive assistance with one’s case.22  The Court 
further held that to show an access violation, a petitioner must demonstrate 
actual injury, i.e., that the state’s failure to provide adequate assistance 
impeded the petitioner in his efforts to pursue a legal claim in 
postconviction proceedings.23  
The Court has not addressed whether a right to counsel attaches in 
federal habeas proceedings.  But federal courts since Finley, Giarratano, 
and Lewis generally have assumed that both capital and noncapital inmates 
                                                
14 Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555-557, 559 (1987) (rejecting right to counsel in state 
postconviction proceedings on both access-to-the-courts and due process, fundamental fairness grounds). 
15 Id. at 557. 
16 Id. 
17 Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1989). 
18 Id. at 3-4, 12; Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977) (“[T]he fundamental constitutional right of 
access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal 
papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the 
law.”). 
19 Murray, 492 U.S. at 14 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
20 Id.  
21 Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 354 (1996). 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 351. 
“MEANINGFUL ACCESS” AND THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
 
do not have a constitutional right to counsel in federal habeas corpus 
proceedings.24  This judicial mindset has remained intact despite the 
dramatic overhaul and inordinate complication of federal habeas practice 
wrought by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.  The 
complexity of post-AEDPA federal habeas practice calls for re-examination 
of the issue and recognition of a limited right to counsel to ensure the 
indigent state inmate’s constitutional right of access to the courts in federal 
habeas proceedings.  
  
B. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
 
On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), which substantially narrowed the legal 
parameters of federal habeas review.25  Conservative advocates had been 
attempting to place limits on capital habeas corpus for decades.26  Critics 
identified habeas practice, rather than the many flaws and irregularities that 
often accompany capital prosecutions, as the source of unacceptable delay 
between conviction and execution.27  Efforts at restricting the Great Writ 
eventually found traction with the domestic terrorist bombing of the 
Oklahoma City Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building, in which 168 people 
perished.  The emotional aftermath of the bombing, and a concomitant 
desire to see “swift justice” imposed on the perpetrators, aligned with 
Republican majorities in Congress to provide the necessary catalyst for 
statutory change.28   
In relevant part,29 AEDPA revised 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244 and 2253-2255, 
which govern all federal habeas corpus proceedings.30  AEDPA also created 
a new Chapter 154 of the Judicial Code for state capital cases that provides 
for rules favorable to the state if the state meets certain conditions, 
including providing assistance of counsel in the state postconviction 
proceedings.31  The Conference Committee report summarized AEDPA’s 
                                                
24 See, e.g., United States v. Pollard, 389 F.3d 101, 111 (4th Cir. 2004); United States v. Perez-Macias, 335 
F.3d 421, 428 (5th Cir. 2003). 
25 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). 
26 See, e.g., 142 Cong. Rec. S4363, 4365 (“Reform of our habeas corpus system has been needed, and 
needed badly, for several decades now.”) (Sen. Abraham) (April 29, 1996). 
27 See, e.g., 142 Cong. Rec. H3599, 3604 (April 18, 1996) (Sen. Hyde) (“Somehow, somewhere we are 
going to end the charade of endless habeas proceedings, and this bill is going to do it.”); 142 Cong. Rec. S3454, 
3459 (April 17, 1996) (Sen. Hatch) (“But just look at the highlights of this antiterrorism bill.  Capital punishment 
reform, death penalty reform, something that has been needed for years, decades.  It is being abused all over the 
country.  There are better than 3,000 people who have been living on death row for years with the sentences never 
carried out. . . .”). 
28 See, e.g., 142 Cong. Rec. S4363 (April 29, 1996) (Sen. Abraham) (“The Oklahoma City bombing finally 
provided the clarion call that made it possible for the Republican majority, with President Clinton’s reluctant 
acquiescence, and over stiff resistance by a majority of the Democrats, to enact reforms to this legal quagmire.”). 
29 Title I of AEDPA revised the federal habeas statutes; the remaining titles are unrelated.  See Lindh v. 
Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-27 n.1 (1997) (noting the other titles address victim restitution, international 
terrorism, weapons and explosives restrictions, and “miscellaneous items,” respectively). 
30 Lindh, 521 U.S. at 326-27. 
31 Lindh, 521 U.S. at 327 (citing chapter 154, 110 Stat. 1221-1226), amended by the USA Patriot 
Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192 (March 9, 2006).  To date, no state 
has been able to satisfy these heightened requirements, which include provision of competent counsel.  See I 
James S. Liebman & Randy Hertz, I Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure § 3.3[a] at 147-152 (6th ed. 
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purpose in revising federal habeas practice as follows:  “This title 
incorporates reforms to curb the abuse of the statutory writ of habeas 
corpus, and to address the acute problems of unnecessary delay and abuse in 
capital cases.”32  Similarly, President Clinton’s signing statement to 
AEDPA declared the statute’s intent as being to “streamline Federal appeals 
for convicted criminals sentenced to the death penalty,” though not to alter 
substantively the standards for issuance of the writ.33   
Despite its stated target of capital cases, AEDPA, as enacted, 
fundamentally changed longstanding provisions governing all federal 
habeas corpus practice.34  Most significantly, the statute introduced a one-
year statute of limitations to filing any federal habeas petition, introduced a 
ban on filing second or successive petitions, and limited the scope of 
substantive review.  At the same time, AEDPA left intact the pre-existing 
doctrines of exhaustion and procedural default.  Federal courts have devoted 
substantial energy since 1996 attempting to understand the intricate 
mechanics of the statute of limitations as applied, as well as its interplay 
with the remaining procedural doctrines.  The resulting doctrine is 
inordinately complex and vexing to even the most experienced of jurists. 
This article does not attempt a thorough exposition of these procedural 
doctrines.35  Rather, what follows is merely a general overview of the 
doctrines that function, at times in concert, to block access to the courts for 
the pro se habeas litigant. 
 
C. Expecting the Impossible:  The Introduction of a One-Year Statute of 
Limitations 
 
Until 1996, there was no fixed time limit for filing a federal habeas 
petition challenging a state conviction.  The only constraint was a flexible 
rule of “prejudicial delay,” which resembled in effect the equitable doctrine 
of laches.36  AEDPA introduced a one-year statute of limitations for filing § 
2254 petitions challenging a state criminal judgment37 and § 2255 motions 
                                                                                                                       
2011).  Hence, this article does not address the implications of those provisions. 
32 H.R. REP. NO. 104-518, at 111 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).  See also I James S. Liebman & Randy Hertz, 
Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure § 3.2 at 112 (5th ed. 2005).   
33 Statement of the President of the United States upon Signing the Antiterrorism Bill (available in LEXIS 
Public Papers of the Presidents, 32 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 719 (White House, Apr. 24, 1996). 
34 See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 274 (2005) (“The enactment of AEDPA in 1996 dramatically altered 
the landscape for federal habeas petitions.”). 
35 For the authoritative treatise on the nuances, intricacies, and history of federal habeas corpus, see I & II 
James S. Liebman & Randy Hertz, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice And Procedure (6th ed. 2011). 
36 See I James S. Liebman & Randy Hertz, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure § 5.2 at 249 (6th 
ed. 2011).   
37 Under AEDPA, for state inmates who seek federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, section 2244(d) 
of that title now provides: 
 
(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a 
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.  The limitation period shall run 
from the latest of –  
 
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the 
expiration of the time for seeking such review; 
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attacking a federal criminal judgment.38  To understand the dramatic impact 
of AEDPA’s statute of limitations requires an examination of its complex 
mechanics.     
Under §§ 2244(d) and 2255, the one-year statute of limitations does not 
start to run until the challenged state or federal judgment becomes final, any 
state-created impediments to filing are removed, and the factual or legal 
bases for a claim become available.39  For state inmates, the time during 
which state habeas proceedings pertinent to the judgment the inmate seeks 
to challenge in federal court are pending tolls the one-year statute of 
limitations.  In light of these myriad triggering and tolling dates, calculation 
of the statute of limitations, particularly under section 2244(d), has proven 
extremely challenging.  Indeed, at virtually every analytical juncture, 
difficult issues have emerged.   Successfully navigating these hurdles 
requires both legal skill and, where judicial precedent is lacking, the ability 
to anticipate accurately AEDPA’s contours.  Absent the fortuity of an 
available and competent “jailhouse lawyer” -- i.e., a fellow inmate self-
educated in the legal process who assists other inmates in litigating claims 
and cases40 -- pro se state habeas petitioners are stymied first by the lack of 
sufficient legal skills to calculate the filing requirements.  Second, even 
where some assistance is provided, legal missteps are not uncommon by 
even highly competent counsel.  But absent a right to counsel in the first 
                                                                                                                       
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in 
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was 
prevented from filing by such State action; 
 
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme 
Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively 
applicable to cases on collateral review; or 
 
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been 
discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 
 
(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review 
with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation 
under this subsection. 
38 For federal inmates seeking habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the revised statute provides: 
 
(f) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this section.  The limitation period shall 
run from the latest of –  
 
(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final; 
 
(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by governmental action in violation of 
the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a 
motion by such governmental action; 
 
(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has 
been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral 
review; or 
 
(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered 
through the exercise of due diligence. 
39 28 U.S.C. § 2244(1)(B)-(D). 
40 See Evan R. Seamone, Fahrenheit 451 on Cell Block D: A Bar Examination to Safeguard America's 
Jailhouse Lawyers from the Post-Lewis Blaze Consuming their Law Libraries, 24 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 91 
(2006). 
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instance, the petitioner is left without a remedy to correct any mistake, 
including those that function to slam the courthouse door shut on 
substantive merits review of federal habeas claims.    
 
1. The Challenge Of Figuring Out Even Where To Begin:  Calculating The 
Elusive Triggering Date For The Statute Of Limitations. 
 
The statute of limitations does not start to run until the judgment an 
inmate seeks to challenge “becomes final.”41  But what does this mean?  
That is, how does an inmate translate these two words into practice in his 
own case?  As with many of the most difficult issues posed under AEDPA, 
the statute itself is silent on the issue. 42 
As an initial matter, the inmate must determine whether to look to state 
or federal law in assessing finality.  Federal appellate courts disagree to 
some extent as to the role of state law in defining “finality” under § 
2244(d)(1)(A).43  Thus, the burden will be on the petitioner to determine 
whether his jurisdiction honors state law in assessing finality.   As with all 
of AEDPA’s statute of limitations intricacies, an error in calculation can 
doom a federal petition to dismissal as untimely.  
But federal courts have generally agreed on several triggering 
principles. First, when the petitioner pursues all available direct appeals 
within the state or federal system, including discretionary appeals, the 
triggering event is either the completion of certiorari proceedings in the 
U.S. Supreme Court or the expiration of time within which to file a petition 
for writ of certiorari.44  Second, if no direct appeal is filed, the conviction 
becomes final at the expiration of the time for filing such appeal.45  The 
same rule obtains where a petitioner files an untimely notice of appeal.46  
Thus, if state law permits a defendant thirty days to file a notice of appeal of 
a conviction by trial or guilty plea, but instead he or she waits a year to do 
so, AEDPA’s statute of limitations will start to run after thirty days.  As a 
result, only one month will remain to file a federal habeas petition by the 
                                                
41 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 
42 The Supreme Court has noted finality under § 2244(d) “is a concept that has been ‘variously defined . . .  
[and] like many legal terms, its precise meaning depends on context.’”  Jimenez v. Quarterman, 129 S.Ct. 681, 
685 (2009). 
43 Compare Roberts v. Cockrell, 319 F.3d 690, 693-95 (5th Cir. 2003) (refusing to consider state law that set 
date of finality of judgment with court of appeals’ issuance of mandate), and Wixom v. Washington, 264 F.3d 
894, 897-98 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2001) (despite state courts’ use of date of issuance of mandate as point of finality of 
judgment, finding conviction became “final” under § 2244(d)(1)(A) when state appellate court denied motion to 
modify ruling), with Tinker v. Moore, 255 F.3d 1331, 1333 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding judgment becomes final on 
date of issuance of mandate, as provided by Florida state law). 
44 See, e.g., Jimenez v. Quarterman, 129 S. Ct. at 685; Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 524-25, 527 
(2003); Robinson v. United States, 416 F.3d 645, 647 (7th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1176 (2006); Nix v. 
Secretary, Dep’t of Corr., 393 F.3d 1235, 1236-37 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1114 
(2005); see also I James S. Liebman & Randy Hertz, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure § 5.2[b] at 
269-271 & n. 485 (6th ed. 2011). 
45 See United States v. Plascencia, 537 F.3d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 2008); Moshier v. United States, 402 F.3d 
116, 118 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam); Sanchez-Castellano v. United States, 358 F.3d 424, 428 (6th Cir. 2004); 
Kapral v. United States, 166 F.3d 565, 575 (3d Cir. 1999); see also I James S. Liebman & Randy Hertz, Federal 
Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure § 5.2[b][i] at 272 & n. 48 (6th ed. 2011). 
46 See Randle v. Crawford, 578 F.3d 1177, 1183-1184 (9th Cir. 2009); Bethea v. Girdich, 293 F.3d 577, 578 
-79 (2d Cir. 2002). 
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time the state notice of appeal is filed.  Similarly, where a petitioner files a 
first direct appeal to the state intermediate appellate court but does not 
pursue a direct appeal as of right to a higher state court, the triggering event 
becomes the date of expiration for filing the appeal to the higher appellate 
court.47  The result is that AEDPA’s trigger date, i.e., when the sand begins 
to slip through the proverbial hour glass for federal habeas review, is a 
moving target, dependent on what relief a petitioner seeks, or fails to seek, 
on direct review.  Yet the calculation is critical for it is obvious that only in 
knowing when the one-year statute of limitations starts to run can a 
petitioner have a chance at determining when it ends. 
 
2. Impediments To Filing: Once The Clock Has Started To Tick, What, If 
Anything, Will Cause It To Stop? 
 
Regardless of when a conviction becomes final, thus triggering the start 
of the one-year period of time to file a federal petition, the statute of 
limitations will not run under § 2244(d) during any period in which a state 
or government-created “impediment” prevents the petitioner from filing the 
petition or motion.48  Such impediments can exist prior to the conviction 
becoming final, thus forestalling the start of the statute of limitations.  Or an 
impediment can arise once the statute of limitations has already started to 
run, thus stopping the clock until such time as the state clears the path to 
filing by removing the impediment.  But once again, AEDPA does not 
delineate what constitutes a state or government-created impediment.49  To 
make matters even more difficult, circuit case law grappling with the 
doctrine is relatively sparse.   
At minimum, courts appear to exempt the role of judiciary from “state 
action,” instead requiring the actor be an arm of either the prosecutor or 
penalogical institution charged with the petitioner’s detention.50  Thus, a 
change in state law that provides a new basis for relief will not qualify as an 
impediment because, notwithstanding the prior adverse precedent, the 
petitioner was still free to raise such claim in a federal petition “at any 
time.”51  In other words, a pro se petitioner is expected to anticipate future 
changes in the law that will inure to his favor, and seek habeas relief on a 
                                                
47 See, e.g., Roberts v. Cockrell, 319 F.3d 690, 693-95 (5th Cir. 2003); Wixom v. Washington, 264 F.2d 894, 
898 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1143 (2002); Gendron v. United States, 154 F.3d 672, 674-75 nn. 1-2 
(7th Cir. 1998) (per curiam), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1113 (1999); see also I James S. Liebman & Randy Hertz, 
Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure § 5.2[b][i] at 272-273 & n. 49 (6th ed. 2011). 
48 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(d)(1)(B); 2255(f)(2).  See also Bryant v. Shriro, 499 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(“To obtain relief under § 2244(d)(1)(B), the petitioner must show a causal connection between the unlawful 
impediment and his failure to file a timely habeas petition.”); see also Broom v. Strickland, 579 F.3d 553, 556-57 
(6th Cir. 2009) (rejecting relief based on impediment for lack of causation). 
49 See Wood v. Spencer, 487 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2007) (noting that the word “impediment” “is not defined in 
the statute itself, nor is it self-elucidating”). 
50 Compare Minter v. Beck, 230 F.3d 663, 665-66 (4th Cir. 2000) (negative caselaw rendering futile raising 
of claim in state court did not constitute state-created “impediment” under § 2244(d)(1)(B), with Critchley v. 
Thaler, 586 F.3d 318, 321 (5th Cir. 2009) (failure of county clerk’s office to timely file petitioners for post-
conviction relief constitutes “impediment” under § 2244(d)(1)(B). 
51 See Shannon v. Newland, 410 F.3d 1083, 1087-88 (9th Cir. 2005); Minter, 230 F.3d at 665-66. 
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ground for which no legal support exists.52 
To date, some circuits have recognized as a possible impediment the 
state’s failure to make available to inmates legal material pertaining to 
AEDPA, i.e., a copy of the statute itself, where the absence of that material 
prevented the petitioner from learning of the one-year statute of 
limitations.53  On the other hand, even in a capital case, errors attributed to 
postconviction counsel, as opposed to a state or government actor, do not 
constitute “impediments” under § 2244(d)(1)(B).54  In addition, the First 
Circuit has rejected an argument that the state’s withholding of exculpatory 
evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland55 constitutes an impediment on 
the ground that the petitioner could have obtained the same evidence 
elsewhere prior to trial in the exercise of due diligence.56   
In light of the underdeveloped state of the law on the definition of 
“impediment,” the lack of assistance of counsel may have a profound effect.  
That is, by exploring the many interstices of this procedural doctrine, a 
skilled advocate may succeed in securing a broader definition from a 
particular court.  In contrast, for the pro se litigant, the doctrine will likely 
lie fallow and useless in his efforts to obtain federal review of otherwise 
untimely filed habeas claims.    
 
3. Necessary Efforts At Identifying Other Statute Of Limitations Triggers 
a. Newly Recognized Constitutional Right 
 
AEDPA’s one-year period of time to file a federal petition is also 
triggered anew under § 2244(d) when the Supreme Court recognizes a new 
constitutional right that is made expressly retroactive to cases on collateral 
review.57  It is an open question whether the Supreme Court itself must 
determine retroactivity, or whether lower federal courts are also authorized 
under AEDPA to do so.58  Every circuit to consider the issue has concluded 
that lower federal courts, as well as the Supreme Court, can make the 
retroactivity assessment.59  Again, the fact that lower courts, at least for 
                                                
52 Unless the Supreme Court makes a change to the substantive law underlying a constitutional claim 
retroactive, even if the prior state of the law were deemed an “impediment,” the inmate would be denied relief on 
the merits.  See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989); § 2254(d). 
53 See Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146, 1147-1148 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); see also Moore v. 
Battaglia, 476 F.3d 504 (7th Cir. 2007) (remanding for development of factual record regarding claim that 
inadequate prison law library constituted a state-created impediment).  But cf., Finch v. Miller, 491 F.3d 424, (8th 
Cir. 2007) (rejecting on causation ground argument that inadequate library facilities or legal assistance qualified 
as impediment). 
54 Cf. Johnson v. Fla. Dep’t. Corr., 513 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 2008) (basing conclusion on the lack of a 
constitutional right to post-conviction counsel), with Finch v. Miller, 491 F.3d 424, (8th Cir. 2007) (basing same 
conclusion on ground that counsel’s conduct does not constitute “state action” under § 2244(d)(1)(B)); Lawrence 
v. Florida, 421 F.3d 1221, (11th Cir. 2005) (incompetent assistance of counsel in capital postconviction 
proceedings “is not the type of State impediment envisioned in § 2244(d)(1)(B)”). 
55 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
56 See Wood v. Spencer, 487 F.3d 1, 6-8 (1st Cir. 2007) (noting “petitioner had the power to blunt the effect 
of any state-created impediment”). 
57 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(d)(1)(C). 
58 I James S. Liebman & Randy Hertz, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure § 5.2[b][i] at 275 & n. 
55 (6th ed. 2011). 
59 Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 364 n.4 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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now, can determine whether a newly recognized right should apply 
retroactively leaves ample room for effective advocacy on the part of the 
petitioner.  Thus, the unrepresented petitioner is at a distinct disadvantage in 
convincing a court of relief from AEDPA’s timeliness bar based on a newly 
recognized constitutional right. 
 
b. Discovery of Factual Predicate 
 
The statute of limitations is also triggered under §§ 2244(d), regardless 
of the above events, on the date on which the petitioner could have 
discovered the factual predicate for the claim or claims raised in the petition 
in the exercise of due diligence.60  The language of § 2244(d)(1)(D) is 
ambiguous as to whether the statute of limitations applies to the petition or 
to independent claims.61  Federal courts appear to endorse the former 
interpretation, though will permit amendment of a pending petition to add a 
claim derived from newly discovered facts that the inmate was unable 
through due diligence to uncover at the time of filing.62  But the petitioner 
must make the case for why he failed to discover the claim or claims earlier.  
Without more, his pro se status, which encompasses the fact that he is 
incarcerated without outside legal and investigative assistance to uncover 
facts that might support a claim for habeas relief, will not suffice.63  Once 
again, courts engage in mythical thinking in assuming that the average 
incarcerated inmate is as able to litigate and conduct factual investigations 
as the professional attorney. 
 
4. Unpacking the Doctrine of Statutory Tolling 
 
Calculating the start date for the statute of limitations is only the 
beginning of the pro se inmate’s daunting procedural challenge of ensuring 
his federal petition is timely filed.  The second major hurdle in determining 
the actual filing deadline is accurately calculating the effects of AEDPA’s 
doctrine of statutory tolling.  As a nod to the principles of federalism that 
permeate federal habeas corpus and the accompanying requirement that 
inmates exhaust all federal claims in state court,64 AEDPA provides that, 
regardless of the date on which the statute of limitations starts to run, for 
inmates challenging state convictions under § 2254, the clock will stop – 
i.e., AEDPA’s one-year filing period is tolled – while “a properly filed 
                                                
60 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(d)(1)(D). 
61 I James S. Liebman & Randy Hertz, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure § 5.2[b][i] at 280-81 
& n. 64 (6th ed. 2011). 
62 Id. at 260-61 & n. 52-55 (internal citations omitted). 
63 Rich v. Dep’t of Corr. State of Fla., 317 F. App’x 881 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that pro se status is not an 
extraordinary circumstance that entitled petitioner to tolling of the one-year time limit); Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 
F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2006) (pro se petitioner’s inability to calculate the limitations period correctly is not an 
extraordinary circumstance and did not allow amendment to relate back to the date the original petition was filed); 
United States v. Hale, 2010 WL 2105141 (S.D. Ala. 2010) (holding that pro se status was not extraordinary 
circumstance to allow petition to be amended after the filing deadline had passed). 
64 See exhaustion discussion, infra. 
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application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect 
to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.”65  But again, the statutory 
language of § 2244(d)(2) raises at least as many questions as it answers.  
For example, what does “properly filed” mean?  Does “or other collateral 
review” include federal habeas petitions?  How should federal courts 
interpret “with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim”?  What does it 
mean to be “pending”?  The federal judiciary has devoted substantial energy 
since AEDPA’s enactment to each of these issues.  As a result, some rules 
are now clear through case law; others remain uncertain.  The pro se inmate 
must discern these nuances and distinctions, with consequences potentially 
fatal to habeas review. 
 
a. The meaning of “properly filed” 
 
For purposes of § 2244(d)(2), “an application is ‘properly filed’ when 
its delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the applicable laws and 
rules governing filings,” such as, “for example, the form of the document, 
the time limits upon its delivery, the court and office in which it must be 
lodged, and the requisite filing fee.”66  Thus, the Supreme Court has 
concluded, at least insofar as state law on timeliness is firmly established 
and consistently applied,67 an untimely state petition is not “properly 
filed.”68  Mundane as these assessments may be, the unrepresented habeas 
petitioner again confronts the task of identifying, understanding, and 
complying with state law governing collateral review in order to qualify for 
AEDPA’s statutory tolling.  Absent assistance from a competent jailhouse 
lawyer or law librarian, the process can stall here, with the inmate unable to 
figure out how to “properly file” a state petition, a step that in turn is 
essential to exhaust claims a petitioner seeks to raise in a federal petition.  
 
b. Figuring out what qualifies for statutory tolling:  The scope of “or other 
collateral review” 
 
In 2001, the Supreme Court held that “application for State post-
conviction or other collateral review” does not contemplate federal habeas 
petitions.69  Rather, the Court held, the phrase refers only to state 
applications, and includes all state procedures available for review of a 
                                                
65 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).   
66 Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000). 
67 See I James S. Liebman & Randy Hertz, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure § 5.2[b][ii] at 
289-90 n. 68 (6th ed. 2011) (noting Pace’s holding “glossed over some complicating factors that were not at issue 
in Pace and that may require additional analysis on the part of a reviewing federal habeas corpus court:” situations 
in which (1) the statute of limitations at issue is not a jurisdictional time bar, as in Pace, but rather functions as an 
affirmative defense subject to waiver; and (2) there was no clear “state law” on timeliness at the relevant stage of 
the proceedings because the timing rule to which the state points – and upon which a state court ultimately relied 
in deeming a state postconviction petition to have been untimely – had not yet been announced or was not firmly 
established and consistently followed at the time the prisoner filed the state postconviction petition.”); see also 
Walker v. Martin, -- S. Ct. -- (2011) (finding California’s timeliness bar independent and consistently applied). 
68 Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 412 (2005). 
69 Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001). 
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criminal conviction.70 Thus, no tolling applies -- i.e., the statute of 
limitations continues to run -- during the time in which a federal habeas 
petition is pending.71   
While the Court’s interpretation of § 2244(d)(2) makes sense as an 
intellectual matter, due to the length of time federal courts take to resolve 
federal petitions, the lack of tolling for federal petitions has generated 
enormous headaches for pro se inmates attempting to comply with the one-
year statute of limitations.72  Even where a pro se inmate manages to 
negotiate the myriad landmines of AEDPA’s statute of limitations and 
timely file his § 2254 petition, it is the rare case in which the one-year 
period will not have expired by the time the federal courts have ruled on the 
petition.  Thus, a petition dismissed for procedural reasons may be forever 
barred on the merits simply because the statute of limitations expired while 
the petition was pending before the federal court.73  This reality hits pro se 
litigants particularly hard for two reasons.  First, it is axiomatic that such 
petitioners are more likely to commit procedural missteps and hence, 
confront this scenario than those represented by counsel.  Second, where a 
petition is at least partially unexhausted, i.e., the inmate has not yet 
presented each claim raised therein to the highest available state court of 
review, a district court will give the inmate the choice between dismissing 
the entire petition “without prejudice” or staying the exhausted portion of 
the petition and holding it in abeyance while the inmate returns to state 
court to finish exhausting.74  The court is not required, however, to advise 
the inmate that if he opts to dismiss the petition in its entirety, the “without 
prejudice” language is illusory in that any subsequent petition in fact will be 
time-barred.75  Hence, a pro se petitioner, well-intentioned but unschooled 
in AEDPA’s intricacies is more likely to opt for dismissal.  He will do so 
with the misguided intention of refiling after exhausting the claims at issue 
without realizing that the statute of limitations has expired and thus, any 
future petition will be time-barred.76 
  
c. Interpreting “with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim” 
                                                
70 Id. at 176. 
71 Duncan, 533 U.S. 167.  
72 Nancy J. King, Fred L. Cheesman II & Brian J. Ostrom, Final Technical Report: Habeas Litigation in U.S. 
District Courts (2007), available at http:// www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/219559.pdf at 42 (as of 2006, 
federal habeas cases filed in 2002 and 2003 had been pending for an average of 5.3 years for capital cases); Judge 
Arthur L. Alarcon, Remedies for California’s Death Row Deadlock, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 697, 699, 708 (in 1989, 
the average delay for a federal habeas corpus case was eight years; as of 2006, a California inmate who filed a 
habeas appeal and had his sentence vacated by a federal court waited an average of 16.75 years); Limin Zheng, 
Actual Innocence as a Gateway Through the Statute-of-Limitations Bar on the Filing of Federal Habeas Corpus 
Petitions, 90 CAL. L. REV. 2101 (2002) (the average time from date of conviction to the filing of a federal habeas 
petition was a year and a half, by 1995 it had increased to five years). 
73 The harshness of this consequence has spawned the “relation back” doctrine and, in some cases, has 
provided a basis for equitable tolling.  These doctrines will be addressed, supra. 
74 Rhines v. Webber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005). 
75 Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225 (2004) (federal district judges are not obligated to warn petitioner that 
subsequently raised federal claims would be time-barred); Brambles v. Duncan, 412 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(court is not obligated to inform petitioner of what he must do to invoke stay and abey procedure or that federal 
claims would be time-barred when he returns to federal court). 
76 See id. 
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State attorneys have argued that § 2244(d)(2) should not apply if the 
“State post-conviction or other collateral review” application did not raise 
any federally cognizable claims or did not involve at least one claim later 
raised in the § 2254 petition.77  Under this argument, if a petitioner files a 
state petition only raising state claims or federally cognizable claims that he 
later abandons before filing for federal habeas relief, no tolling under § 
2244(d)(2) would apply.  Given the likelihood that, untolled, AEDPA’s 
statute of limitations would expire while such state application is pending, 
such an interpretation would likely be a death warrant for any future federal 
habeas review.  To avoid this consequence, a petitioner would have to 
anticipate and contemplate the contours of federal habeas review even 
before filing for any state collateral review.  Not only might this limit the 
utility of the state collateral review process,78 but again, the pro se litigant, 
less able to identify all potential claims, state and federal, from the 
beginning and thus, more prone to piecemeal litigation, may find himself 
time-barred from federal review. 
Thus far, every circuit court to address this issue has rejected the state 
attorneys’ argument for such a strict interpretation of “pertinent judgment or 
claim.”79  Rather, the federal appeals courts have held that tolling applies 
regardless of the particular claims raised in the state postconviction petition, 
as long as the state and federal petition attack the same criminal judgment.80 
But the Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue.  Hence, the pro se 
litigant remains vulnerable to a future Supreme Court ruling to the contrary.   
 
d. Figuring out the meaning of “pending” 
 
Lastly, federal courts have grappled with the meaning of “pending” as 
used in § 2244(d)(2).  What does it mean for a petition to be pending in 
state court?  Does this mean that in order to stop AEDPA’s clock, a state 
petition must literally be pending before a state court?  Or does the word 
also contemplate the necessary time gaps between filings in lower and 
appellate state courts?  Again, AEDPA, itself is silent on the issue.   
In 2002, in Carey v. Saffold, the Supreme Court concluded as a 
threshold matter that “the statutory word ‘pending’ . . . cover[s] the time 
between a lower state court’s decision and the filing of a [timely] notice of 
appeal to a higher state court.”81  Thus, statutory tolling applies during the 
intervals between a lower court’s denial of a state petition and the filing of a 
                                                
77 See, e.g., Cowherd v. Million, 380 F.3d 909, 912, 913-14 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc); Ford v. Moore, 296 
F.3d 1035, 1040 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam); Sweger v. Chesney, 294 F.3d 506, 520 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. 
denied, 538 U.S. 1002 (2003); Carter v. Litscher, 275 F.3d 663, 665 (7th Cir. 2001). 
78 Arguably, a state petition for collateral review filed merely as a formality for exhaustion purposes will not 
explore the parameters of relief under state law as fully as one focused primarily on the state process. 
79 See, e.g., Cowherd v. Million, 380 F.3d 909, 912, 913-14 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc); Ford v. Moore, 296 
F.3d 1035, 1040 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam); Sweger v. Chesney, 294 F.3d 506, 520 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. 
denied, 538 U.S. 1002 (2003); Carter v. Litscher, 275 F.3d 663, 665 (7th Cir. 2001). 
80 See note 75. 
81 Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 217 (2002). 
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timely appeal.  But Saffold was a California case, which complicated 
matters in that the state uses a unique system of collateral review in which 
each court – trial, appellate, and supreme – has original jurisdiction to 
consider an inmate’s postconviction petition.82  Although in practice, most 
petitioners ascend the courts as in other states, state law does not require 
that they do so.  And each petition an inmate files challenging a conviction 
is considered “original,” rather than an appeal of a lower court’s denial.83  
Thus, it was unclear whether a petitioner was entitled to tolling under § 
2244(d)(2) for the intervals that elapse between a state court’s denial of one 
petition and the filing of a subsequent one in a higher state court.84  The 
Court in Saffold concluded, albeit somewhat opaquely, that interval tolling 
does apply at least insofar as the petitioner timely files his subsequent 
petition.85  But in so ruling, the Court acknowledged that “[t]he fact that 
California’s timeliness standard is general rather than precise may make it 
more difficult for federal courts to determine just when a review application 
(i.e., a filing in a higher court) comes too late.”86  Indeed, the Court 
remanded the case, in part, for the Ninth Circuit to consider whether a four 
and a half-month gap between petitions filed in the California Court of 
Appeal and California Supreme Court rendered the latter untimely.87 
Four years later, in Evans v. Chavis, the Supreme Court again attempted 
to clarify the tolling doctrine as applied in California.88  In Evans, 
approximately three years had elapsed between the Court of Appeal’s denial 
of a petition and the petitioner’s filing in the California Supreme Court.89  
The state supreme court denied the latter petition without comment in a 
summary order.90  In concluding that the collateral review application was 
“pending” during the three-year period and thus, that the petitioner was 
entitled to tolling under § 2244(d)(2), the Ninth Circuit treated the denial 
“without comment or citation” as a “decision on the merits,” rather than a 
dismissal as untimely.91 
On review, the Supreme Court summarized its decision in Saffold as 
holding:  “(1) only a timely appeal tolls AEDPA’s 1-year limitations period 
for the time between the lower court’s adverse ruling and the filing of a 
notice of appeal in the higher court; (2) in California, “unreasonable” delays 
are not timely; and (3) (most pertinently) a California Supreme Court order 
denying a petition “on the merits” does not “automatically” indicate that the 
                                                
82 See Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 221-223 (2002) (describing California’s collateral review system); 
Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1036 (9th Cir. 2005) (acknowledging difficulty in applying tolling provisions to 
the California habeas process because each of the three levels of state courts has original jurisdiction in habeas 
proceedings); Welch v. Carey, 350 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that a habeas petitioner is entitled to “one 
full round of collateral review” in the state courts before the federal statute of limitations begins to run). 
83 Each state court determines the timeliness of a petition based on an indeterminate, “reasonableness” 
standard, rather than a notice of appeal.  See Carey, 536 U.S. at 221. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 222-23. 
86 Id. at 223. 
87 Id. at 226-27. 
88 546 U.S. 189 (2006). 
89 Id. at 195-96. 
90 Id. at 195. 
91 Chavis v. LeMarque, 382 F.3d 921, 926 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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petition was timely filed.”92  The Court observed that, for at least six months 
of the time elapsed between petitions, petitioner had access to the prison law 
library to work on his petition.93  Additionally, the Court “found no 
authority suggesting, nor found any convincing reason to believe, that 
California would consider an unjustified or unexplained six-month filing 
delay ‘reasonable.’”94  The Court therefore concluded the petition was not 
“pending” within the meaning of § 2244(d)(2) during the interval between 
denial of the Court of Appeal’s petition and petitioner’s filing in the state 
supreme court.95  Thus, the Court reversed and remanded the case to the 
Ninth Circuit for further proceedings.  In so doing, as in Saffold, the Court 
did not define “reasonableness” with any precision, instead deferred to state 
law and a petitioner’s particular circumstances to inform that 
determination.96  
For the California litigant, the legal contours of statutory tolling after 
Saffold and Evans are far from clear.  In both cases, the Supreme Court 
demurred on telling the lower courts – and hence, habeas petitioners – what 
exactly constitutes a reasonable interval between state petitions to qualify 
for interval tolling under § 2244(d)(2).  Thus, petitioners must make their 
best guess at how much is too much time to take in preparing a subsequent 
petition.  Where that guess is wrong, such as in Saffold and Evans, the 
petitioner will be time-barred from federal habeas review under AEDPA.  
As with the other intricacies of procedural calculations under AEDPA, the 
pro se litigant is particularly vulnerable to this consequence as a result of 
simple miscalculation or simply requiring more time than deemed 
“reasonable” to investigate, research, and present habeas claims from behind 
bars.  Indeed, it is profoundly unfair to expect accuracy in calculation from a 
pro se inmate on a topic that neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth 
Circuit has succeeded at clarifying. 
There exists an additional aspect of statutory tolling calculation that 
may prove particularly challenging to a pro se litigant in California:  Lower 
federal courts have applied statutory tolling to any second or successive 
state postconviction petition that is “properly filed” pursuant to state 
procedural law.97  But tolling is unavailable for the intervals between 
successive rounds of state habeas petitions.98   
Again, California is the problem child, as federal courts have struggled 
to identify the point at which one “round” of postconviction petitions ends 
and the next begins.99  For example, because each court has original 
jurisdiction, a California petitioner can file three consecutive petitions in 
                                                
92 546 U.S. 189, 197 (2006). 
93 Id. at 201. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 See, e.g., Drew v. Department of Corr., 297 F.3d 1278, 1284-85 (11th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 
1237 (2003); Rhine v. Boone, 182 F.3d 1153, 1155 (10th Cir.  1999); Lovasz v. Vaugn, 134 F.3d 146, 148-49 (3d 
Cir. 1998). 
98 Banjo v. Ayers, 614 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2010). 
99 See, e.g., Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1040-45 (9th Cir. 2005). 
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superior court, two petitions in the court of appeal, and a third in the state 
supreme court, and not necessarily in ascending order.100  Or a petitioner 
can skip over the lower courts altogether and file directly in the state 
supreme court.101  How then to define the parameters of “one round” of 
habeas petitions?  The Ninth Circuit has attempted to do so by assessing the 
claims raised in each individual petition to determine similarity or 
distinctiveness.102  But petitions involving overlapping claims – some 
repeat, and some new – defy easy categorization.103  If a pro se litigant 
wrongly assumes he is pursuing a continuous “round” of habeas petitions, 
and calculates his one-year period under AEDPA accordingly, he may be 
ineligible for continuous tolling under § 2244(d)(2) and hence, face 
dismissal of his § 2254 petition as time-barred. 
 
5. Mining the Indeterminate Doctrine of Equitable Tolling   
 
Yet another source of perplexity in calculating the time to file a federal 
petition under AEDPA is the doctrine of equitable tolling.  This doctrine is 
a creature of common law, rather than the statute itself, with federal courts 
importing it from other statutory contexts.  Founded on principles of equity 
– that is, what is “fair” under particular circumstances – the doctrine is 
necessarily flexible and resists ready categorization.104  Instead, courts 
inquire whether extraordinary circumstances, apart from the inmate’s lack 
of due diligence, prevented him from filing his petition on time.105  Courts 
define “due diligence,” in turn, as “reasonable diligence,” rather than 
“maximum feasible diligence.”106 
Until very recently, a majority of the Supreme Court had not embraced 
the doctrine in the context of AEDPA.107  In Holland v. Florida., however, 
decided in June 2010, the Court agreed with every circuit to address the 
issue that the doctrine is in fact a viable one under AEDPA.108  To qualify 
for equitable tolling, a petitioner must identify an “extraordinary” 
circumstance that prevented his filing and show that he exercised 
reasonable diligence despite that circumstance.  Both tasks require legal and 
analytical skills on the part of the advocate. 
Courts have endorsed equitable tolling where delay that prevents timely 
                                                
100 See Cal. Const., Art. VI, § 10; Walker v. Martin, -- S. Ct. – (2011) (noting that where the superior court 
denies a petition, the petitioner can obtain review of the claims raised therein only by filing a new petition in the 
court of appeal, confined to claims raised in the initial petition). 
101 Id. 
102 Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2005) (comparing claims in multiple applications and granting 
tolling because some claims overlapped). 
103 Welch v. Carey, 350 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that a petitioner is not entitled to tolling when he 
abandons all initial claims from a first application in a subsequent application); In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 770 
(1993) (“A successive petition presenting additional claims that could have been presented in an earlier attack on 
the judgment is, of necessity, a delayed petition,” requiring a “persuasive reason for routinely permitting 
consideration of the merits of such claims.”). 
104 Holland v. Fla., 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2563 (2010). 
105 Id. at 2553 (citing Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)). 
106 Id. at 2565. 
107 Id. at 2560. 
108 Id.  
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filing results from judicial action or omission;109 certain actions or 
omissions of petitioner’s counsel;110 the prisoner’s mental incompetence;111 
and failure to provide petitioner notice of AEDPA’s filing deadline, either 
through adequate law library or legal assistance facilities or court 
notification.112  But prior to Holland, lower courts generally assumed a lack 
of postconviction counsel or postconviction counsel’s miscalculation of the 
statute of limitations does not provide a basis for equitable tolling because 
such circumstance is not “extraordinary” given the lack of a constitutional 
right to postconviction counsel.113  Indeed, in Holland, the majority seems 
to affirm this approach, acknowledging that “a garden variety claim of 
excusable neglect, . . . such as a simple ‘miscalculation’ that leads a lawyer 
to miss a filing deadline . . . does not warrant equitable tolling.”114  But at 
the same time, the Court observes that sufficiently egregious attorney error 
may qualify as an “extraordinary” circumstance justifying equitable 
tolling.115  Thus, the Court remanded the case to the Eleventh Circuit for 
further findings and possible proceedings on the issue.116   
                                                
109 Pliler v. Ford, 124 S. Ct. 241, 2447 (2004) (remanding to Ninth Circuit on issue whether magistrate judge 
“affirmatively misled” petitioner, resulting in subsequent filing of time-barred petition, thus warranting equitable 
tolling); see, e.g., Keenan v. Bagley, 400 F.3d 417, 421 (6th Cir. 2005) (remanding for evidentiary hearing on 
whether Ohio Supreme Court’s order extending state statute of limitations justified equitable tolling of federal 
statute of limitations); Knight v. Schofield, 292 F.3d 709, 709-10 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (petitioner entitled 
to equitable tolling where state supreme court sent notice of decision to wrong person, thus denying petitioner 
timely notice). 
110 Fonesca v. Hall, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1119 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (petitioner entitled to equitable tolling because of 
the “egregious misconduct” of habeas counsel); Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 2003) (petitioner 
entitled to equitable tolling because of counsel’s “sufficiently egregious” misconduct); Downs v. McNeil, 520 
F.3d 1311 (11th Cir. 2008) (remanding for evidentiary hearing to decide whether petitioner was entitled to 
equitable tolling because of egregious conduct by counsel). 
111 Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that equitable 
tolling was warranted because of petitioner’s mental incompetency); Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 
2003) (remanding for determination of whether petitioner’s mental illness constitutes an “extraordinary 
circumstance” which would justify equitable tolling). 
112 Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2006) (remanding for evidentiary hearing to decide whether 
petitioner was entitled to equitable tolling because of insufficient legal resources in prison law library); Phillips v. 
Donnelly, 216 F.3d 508 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding equitable tolling warranted due to four-month delay in notifying 
petitioner of denial of habeas petition); Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021 (9th Cir. 2005) (equitable 
tolling appropriate where petitioner was not allowed access to his legal files for eleven months); Litt v. Mueller, 
304 F.3d  918 (9th Cir. 2002) (remanding to determine if equitable tolling was warranted because petitioner was 
deprived of access to his legal files for eighty-two days). 
113 Lovato v. Suthers, 42 F. App’x 400 (10th Cir. 2002) (equitable tolling not warranted even when petitioner 
missed the filing deadline because a public defender advised him to wait until after a proportionality review); 
Beery v. Ault, 312 F.3d 948 (8th Cir. 2002) (equitable tolling not warranted when counsel took six months to 
inform petitioner that motion for appointment of postconviction counsel had been denied); Kreutzer v. Bowersox, 
231 F.3d 460 (8th Cir. 2000) (counsel’s failure to understand the one-year statute of limitations under AEDPA did 
not warrant equitable tolling); Howell v. Crosby, 415 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2005) (equitable tolling was not 
appropriate even though counsel filed a state petition for postconviction relief two months after the federal 
deadline); Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2001) (equitable tolling not available for miscalculation by 
counsel of the limitations period). 
114 Holland v. Fla., 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2564 (internal quotations omitted). 
115 Id. at 2564 (noting that counsel not only failed to file Holland’s petition on time and appeared unaware of 
the deadline to do so -- factors which, alone, “suggest simple negligence” -- but also failed to file on time despite 
Holland’s many letters emphasizing the importance of doing so; failed to research the proper filing date despite 
Holland’s letters identifying the correct authority for determining that date; failed to inform Holland in a timely 
manner that the Florida Supreme Court had denied his petition, thus restarting the AEDPA’s one-year clock, 
despite Holland’s repeated requests for this information; and failed to communicate with Holland over a period of 
years, despite Holland’s repeated attempts to do so). 
116 Id. at 2565 (noting the Eleventh Circuit erroneously concluded equitable tolling was per se inapplicable 
based on attorney error and the district court erroneously concluded that Holland had failed to exercise due 
diligence).  
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This decision opens the door to further litigation regarding the effect of 
attorney error – or perhaps even the denial of counsel altogether in an 
unusually complicated case – on the availability of equitable tolling in a 
particular case.  Again, these are arguments that a typical pro se inmate is ill 
equipped to make on his own behalf, but that could ultimately make the 
difference between dismissal of a petition as untimely and judicial review 
on the merits. 
Due – or reasonable – diligence, on the other hand, at least until 
Holland, requires more than identifying an objective circumstance that 
impeded a pro se litigant’s preparation of his federal petition.  For example, 
some courts have held that a potentially extraordinary circumstance – such 
as a six-week prison lockdown that precludes law library access – that 
arises at the start of the one-year limitations period does not justify tolling 
because a diligent petitioner still has an opportunity to make up for the lost 
time.117  By contrast, the same six-week lockdown that occurs one month 
before the filing deadline may justify six weeks of equitable tolling.118  
Thus, again, a pro se inmate seeking equitable tolling based on a 
circumstance beyond his control must take care to demonstrate adequate 
causation, which is an inherently legal showing and one he may be hard-
pressed to plead sufficiently without assistance of counsel.  Again, the 
consequence of failing to plead adequately will be dismissal of a petition as 
untimely, regardless of the merits of the claims raised therein. 
 
D. The Delicate Interplay Between AEDPA’s Statute Of Limitations And 
Other Procedural Doctrines 
 
The complexity of calculating AEDPA’s statute of limitations multiplies 
exponentially in light of other procedural requirements under the statute.  
For the typical pro se inmate, the interplay between these procedural 
doctrines can convert an otherwise herculean task to a literally impossible 
one.  The primary culprits are the exhaustion requirement, prohibition on 
second or successive petitions, and, to a lesser extent, the procedural default 
doctrine. 
 
1. The Exhaustion Requirement 
 
The exhaustion requirement, which is founded on principles of 
federalism, requires state inmates to present each habeas claim to the 
                                                
117 See, e.g., Hizbullahankhamon v. Walker, 255 F.3d 65, 67, 75-76 (2d Cir. 2001) (no equitable tolling for 
22 days spent in solitary confinement, and without access to legal materials, at outset of one-year limitations 
period); Pfeil v. Everett, 9 F. App’x 973 (10th Cir. 2001) (equitable tolling not warranted for lockdown because 
petitioner had eight months after the lockdown ended to pursue his claims).  But cf. Giraldes v. Ramirez-Palmer, 
1998 WL 775085 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (a lockdown over eleven months into his one-year deadline did not warrant 
equitable tolling because petitioner had time prior to the lockdown to work on his petition). 
118 United States ex rel Strong v. Hulick, 530 F. Supp. 2d 1034 (N.D. Ill., Eastern Div. 2008) (equitable 
tolling warranted because petitioner was incorrectly informed of deadline, was in lockdown for fifteen of the 
twenty-three weeks immediately preceding his filing deadline, and was not given priority access to the law library 
when lockdown ended). 
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highest state court before filing in federal court.  The doctrine predates 
AEDPA and AEDPA did little to change it.119  But AEDPA’s statute of 
limitations significantly complicates the potential consequences of the 
exhaustion requirement.  Some problems are simply a matter of statutory 
mechanics.  Under the pre-AEDPA decision in Rose v. Lundy,120 federal 
courts were required to dismiss “without prejudice” a mixed petition, i.e., 
one that contains both exhausted and unexhausted claims.  In theory, the 
petitioner then is able to return to state court to finish exhausting the claims 
and then, assuming the state court provides no relief, re-file the federal 
petition.121  The dilemma, post-AEDPA is that, as discussed, the statute of 
limitations is not tolled during the period of time in which a federal petition 
is pending in federal court.122  Thus, by the time a district court decides to 
dismiss a petition as mixed under Rose v. Lundy because some of the claims 
are unexhausted, or as entirely unexhausted, the statute of limitations often 
has run.  As a result, the petitioner will be time-barred from re-filing the 
federal petition after exhausting all of the claims.  In Rhines v. Weber, the 
Supreme Court noted: 
 
The problem is not limited to petitioners who file close to the 
AEDPA deadline.  Even a petitioner who files early will have no 
way of controlling when the district court will resolve the question of 
exhaustion.  Thus, whether a petitioner ever receives federal review 
of his claims may turn on which district court happens to hear his 
case.123 
 
In attempt to address this dilemma, the Court in Rhines unanimously 
embraced a stay-and-abeyance procedure.124  This procedure allows the 
district court to stay a mixed petition and hold it in abeyance while the 
petitioner returns to state court to finish exhausting.125  Once the petitioner 
has finished exhausting his claims in state court, the district court will lift 
the stay and consider the entire petition.126  But, while the district court 
must give a petitioner the option to stay and hold in abeyance his petition 
before dismissing it, the court is under no obligation to advise the petitioner 
                                                
119 Post-AEDPA, if a federal habeas petition contains an unexhausted claim that the court would otherwise 
be required to dismiss for failure to exhaust, the court may nonetheless deny the petition on the merits if it 
determines the claim has no merit. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). The court’s authority to consider an unexhausted claim 
is also subject to an express waiver by the state of the exhaustion requirement.  28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3). 
120 455 U.S. 509 (1982). 
121 Id.; see Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 274 (2005) (noting Rose “imposed a requirement of ‘total 
exhaustion’ and directed federal courts to effectuate that requirement by dismissing mixed petitions without 
prejudice and allowing petitioners to return to state court to present the unexhausted claims to that court in the 
first instance. . . . [P]etitioners who returned to state court to exhaust their previously unexhausted claims could 
come back to federal court to present their perfected petitioners with relative ease.  See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 
U.S. 473, 486 (2000) (dismissal without prejudice under Lundy ‘contemplated that the prisoner could return to 
federal court after the requisite exhaustion.’)”); I James S. Liebman & Randy Hertz, Federal Habeas Corpus 
Practice And Procedure § 5.2[b][v] at 317-318, n. 97  (6th ed. 2011). 
122 See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001). 
123 Rhines, 544 U.S. at 275. 
124 Id. at 277-79. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
“MEANINGFUL ACCESS” AND THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
 
that a failure to accept its stay-and-abeyance offer will likely foreclose later 
habeas review on timeliness grounds.127  Tellingly, the Supreme Court 
concluded it unfair to impose the burden of making that difficult 
determination on the district court.128  Thus, a petitioner may opt to dismiss 
the petition in its entirety without realizing that, in so doing, he is forever 
closing the courthouse doors on himself.  The pro se petitioner, unschooled 
in the complexities of the statute of limitations mechanics, is particularly 
vulnerable to such poor decision-making.   
Nor does the stay-and-abeyance procedure offer any relief to a petitioner 
who has filed an entirely unexhausted, rather than mixed, petition.129  In that 
case, the district court has no choice but to dismiss the petition in its 
entirety, regardless of whether the petitioner will subsequently be time-
barred from re-filing.130  Thus, the pro se petitioner unfamiliar with the 
exhaustion requirement who acts diligently in filing a timely federal petition 
will be barred from federal review because the statute of limitations will 
have expired.  AEDPA’s statutory tolling provision for state collateral 
proceedings, discussed supra, will be useless to him because it is impossible 
to toll an already-expired limitations period. 
The statute of limitations complicates the exhaustion requirement for the 
pro se litigant in yet another manner, one for which the Supreme Court has 
not attempted to craft a remedy.  As discussed, AEDPA’s statutory tolling 
provision set forth under § 2244(d)(1) stops the one-year clock while the 
petitioner is exhausting potential federal claims, i.e., while state 
postconviction petitions are pending.  But the statute of limitations is not 
tolled until the petitioner actually files a state petition.  The clock will 
continue to run during the time in which the petitioner is researching and 
preparing that petition.  A problem arises in states that provide inmates with 
more than one year to seek postconviction relief.131  Unless the inmate is 
sophisticated enough to realize at the threshold of his incarceration both that 
(1) the federal deadline is one-year from the date the conviction becomes 
final; and (2) that time period will continue to run until the inmate files a 
state post-conviction petition, despite acting diligently and timely filing 
under state law, he will still unwittingly miss AEDPA’s deadline.  Self-
described “jailhouse lawyer” Thomas O’Bryant, who authored a symposium 
                                                
127 Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225 (2004) (federal district judges are not obligated to warn petitioner that federal 
claims would be time-barred); Brambles v. Duncan, 412 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2005) (court is not obligated to 
inform petitioner of what he must do to invoke stay-and-abey procedure or that federal claims would be time-
barred when he returns to federal court). 
128 See id. 
129 Jiminez v. Rice, 267 F.3d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming dismissal of petition on ground that it 
contained only unexhausted claims); Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that district 
judges have discretion to grant a stay-and-abeyance while unexhausted claims are exhausted, but declining to 
extend Rhines to situations where the petition contains only unexhausted claims, even where there may be 
unexhausted claims that could be added). 
130 Id. 
131 See, e.g., Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 (instructing that postconviction motions are first filed 
in trial court, within two years of the date the conviction becomes final); New Jersey Rule 3:22-12(a)(1) (“no 
petition shall be filed pursuant to this rule more than 5 years after the date of entry pursuant to Rule 3:21-5 of the 
judgment of conviction that is being challenged”); Maryland Crim. Proc. Code Ann. § 7-103(b) (petitions must be 
filed within ten years of the sentence imposition). 
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piece for the Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Journal in 2006 that 
powerfully describes the virtual impossibility of filing a timely federal 
petition from within the Florida Department of Corrections and his own 
experience missing the AEDPA deadline, writes: 
 
[P]risoners begin preparing for state post-conviction remedies under 
the mistaken belief that they may use the entire two-year period [allotted 
under state law] before filing their post-conviction motion in the state 
court without missing any important deadlines. 
I have been asked many times by prisoners who are out of time for 
seeking federal habeas review, “How can I have only one year to file a 
federal habeas corpus when I can’t file it until after I finish my state 
remedies, and I have two years to file state post-conviction motions?   
Should my federal time not begin after I finish with my state post-
conviction remedies?”  Such a situation does not seem logical, but it is 
the situation.132 
 
2. AEDPA’s Proscription on Second or Successive Petitions 
 
A federal petition that attacks the same criminal judgment as had a prior 
petition that the district court decided on the merits rather than procedural 
grounds is considered “second or successive.”133  Before AEDPA’s 
enactment, federal courts assessed second or successive petitions in two 
ways.  If the successive petition raised claims distinct from those presented 
in the first petition and the state objected that the petition was an “abuse of 
the writ,” the inmate had to show “cause” for not raising the claim in the 
previous petition and that he would suffer “prejudice” or a “fundamental 
miscarriage of justice” if the court declined to review the claim.134  If, on 
the other hand, the petitioner sought to raise a claim brought in a previous 
petition that the court had decided on the merits, the court would consider 
the claim only where inmate demonstrated “cause and prejudice” and the 
“ends of justice” so warranted.135  But federal courts applied the same 
cause-and-prejudice exception that applied to new claims analysis. 
AEDPA implemented significant changes to both the governing 
procedures and substantive standards for second or successive petitions.  In 
so doing, the revised statute dramatically restricted a petitioner’s ability to 
file such a petition.  First, the statute entirely prohibits filing a successive 
petition containing the same claims as presented in the initial petition.  
Procedurally, a petitioner seeking to file a second or successive petition that 
                                                
132 Thomas C. O’Bryant, The Great Unobtainable Write:  Indigent Pro Se Litigation After the Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Symposium:  Pro Se Litigation Ten Years After AEDPA, 41 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 299, 333 (2006). 
133 II James S. Liebman & Randy Hertz, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure §28.3[b] at 1574-
1575 (6th ed. 2011). 
134 See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991); II James S. Liebman & Randy Hertz, Federal Habeas 
Corpus Practice and Procedure §28.2[a], [b] at 1572-1573 (6th ed. 2011). 
135 See Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 339 (1992) (citation omitted); II James S. Liebman & Randy Hertz, 
Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure §28.2[b] at 1567-1571 (6th ed. 2011). 
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presents new claims beyond those raised in the first petition must first 
obtain authorization from a three-judge circuit panel by showing that the 
petition satisfies AEDPA’s substantive criteria.136  The court of appeals 
must act on the application for authorization within thirty days and its 
decision is not appealable, i.e., cannot be the basis for a petition for 
rehearing or petition for certiorari.137 
Substantively, AEDPA’s standards for issuance of an order authorizing 
a second or successive petition are very high:  The petitioner must show 
either:  
 
(A)  . . . that the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, 
made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, 
that was previously unavailable; or 
 
(B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been 
discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; and 
 
(ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of 
the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish clear and 
convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable 
factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying 
offense [i.e., actual innocence].138 
 
By significantly restricting the availability of successive petitions, 
AEDPA puts substantial pressure on the petitioner to include all viable 
claims in the initial petition to ensure federal judicial review.  This task is a 
daunting one in light of the one-year time period within which the petitioner 
must file.  Prior to AEDPA, a petitioner was able to file an initial petition 
containing claims that he litigated on direct appeal – i.e., claims that 
required only copying from one pleading to another – but then take the time 
needed to investigate and develop new claims that required expansion of the 
factual record.  Post-AEDPA, such petitioner must make the tactical 
decision whether to file the petition quickly, with hopes to amend it before 
the court rules on it to add additional claims, or take the extra time required 
to prepare the additional claims and hope still to comply with the statute of 
limitations strictures.  Again, expecting this level of legal sophistication 
from the average pro se litigant is naïve at best. 
 
3. Procedural Default 
 
The doctrine of procedural default also predates AEDPA and was 
unchanged by the statute:  If a claim raised in a federal petition is 
exhausted, but the state court denied it on an independent and adequate 
                                                
136 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A)-(C). 
137 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(D)-(E). 
138 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3). 
27 Emily Garcia Uhrig 
 
procedural grounds rather than its merits, the federal court will dismiss it as 
procedurally defaulted, absent a showing of cause and prejudice or actual 
innocence.139  If the petitioner did not properly exhaust the claim but is now 
procedurally barred under state law from doing so, the claim is also 
considered procedurally defaulted and will be dismissed with prejudice, 
again, absent a showing of cause and prejudice or actual innocence.140  But 
a federal court will not honor a state procedural rule unless it is considered 
“independent and adequate.”141  To be “independent,” a state rule cannot be 
interwoven with federal law.142  To be “adequate,” the rule must have been 
firmly established and consistently applied at the time it was invoked by the 
state court.143  “State rules that are too inconsistently or arbitrarily applied 
to bar federal review ‘generally fall into two categories:  (1) rules that have 
been selectively applied to bar the claims of certain litigants . . . and (2) 
rules that are so unsettled due to ambiguous or changing state authority that 
applying them to bar a litigant’s claim is unfair.’”144   
Assessment of whether a state procedural rule is independent and 
adequate is often very involved and the governing principles far from 
clear.145  Again, for the average pro se habeas petitioner, the challenge of 
understanding this doctrine and effectively countering claims of default, all 
within the one year allotted by the AEDPA, is an exceedingly difficult, if 
not impossible one. 
 
E. The Prototypical Inmate 
 
The procedural complexity of AEDPA litigation, daunting for any 
layperson, is all the more impenetrable for many pro se litigants in light of 
the high rates of illiteracy and mental health problems that plague the U.S. 
prison and jail populations.  The Supreme Court, itself, has taken as 
axiomatic the fact that the inmate population suffers from 
disproportionately high rates of illiteracy and mental health problems.146  
Empirical data bears out this assumption. 
The U.S. Department of Education’s most recent study of inmate 
literacy rates, based on data collected in 2003, measured three types of 
literacy:  prose, document, and quantitative literacy.147  “Prose literacy” 
                                                
139 See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991); Wainright v. Sykes, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). 
140 Bousley v. U.S., 523 U.S. 614, 622 (1998) (“Where a defendant has procedurally defaulted a claim by 
failing to raise it on direct review, the claim may be raised in habeas only if the defendant can first demonstrate 
either ‘cause’ and actual ‘prejudice,’ or that he is ‘actually innocent.’”). 
141 See Martin v. Walker, 131 S. Ct. 1120, 1127 (2011); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74 (1980). 
142 Martin, 131 S. Ct. at  1127; Ake, 470 U.S. at 75. 
143 See Martin, 131 S. Ct. at 1127 ; Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411 (1991); Valerio v. Crawford, 306 F.3d 742 
(9th Cir. 2002) (en banc). 
144 Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 583 (9th Cir. 2003), quoting Wood v. Hall, 130 F.3d 373, 376 (9th Cir. 
1997)).   
145 See, e.g., Martin v. Walker, 131 S. Ct. 1120 (concluding California’s timeliness bar was independent and 
adequate as applied and thus, a basis for procedural default of claims litigant sought to raise in federal petition). 
146 See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579 (1974); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 496 (1969) (J. 
Douglas, concurring). 
147 See U.S. DEPT OF ED., LITERACY BEHIND BARS:  RESULTS FROM THE 2003 NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF 
ADULT LITERACY PRISON SURVEY (2003), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2007/2007473.pdf. 
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describes “”[t]he knowledge and skills needed to search, comprehend, 
and use information from continuous texts[, which would] include 
editorials, news stories, brochures, and instructional materials.”148  
“Document literacy” reflects “[t]he knowledge and skills needed to 
search, comprehend, and use information from noncontinuous texts [and 
would] include job applications, payroll forms, transportation schedules, 
maps, tables, and drug or food labels.”149  Lastly, “quantitative literacy” 
encompasses “[t]he knowledge and skills needed to identify and perform 
computations using numbers that are embedded in printed materials[, 
such as] balancing a checkbook, computing a tip, completing an order 
form, or determining the amount of interest on a loan from an 
advertisement.150  There were four categories of literacy: below basic, 
basic, intermediate, and proficient.151   
The report did not explicitly evaluate the ability of an inmate to read 
and comprehend complex legal documents, statutes, or caselaw, let 
alone to understand the intricacies of federal habeas filing requirements.  
But based on the above definitions, such ability would implicate 
primarily prose and, to a lesser extent, quantitative and document 
literacy skills.  Moreover, comprehending and effectively wielding 
federal habeas corpus doctrine would require, at minimum, a proficient 
level of literacy.  The results from the study suggest very few individuals 
behind bars would possess this capacity in that only 2% showed 
proficient levels of document and quantitative literacy and 3% tested 
proficient in prose literacy.152  For the remainder of inmates, even 
assuming sufficient access to an up-to-date prison law library,153 legal 
materials pertaining to habeas corpus practice lie far beyond the 
reasonable comprehension of those who need to understand it most:  
inmates who are required to function as their own legal counsel in 
                                                
148 Id. at iv. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. 
151 “Below Basic” reflects “an adult [who] has no more than the most simple and concrete literacy skills.” 
“Basic” means “that an adult has the skills necessary to perform simple and everyday literacy activities.”  
“Intermediate” indicates that an adult is able “to perform moderately challenging literacy activities.”  “Proficient” 
signifies “that an adult has the skills necessary to perform more complex and challenging literacy activities. The 
separate category, “nonliterate in English,” applies to individuals unable to complete a minimum number of basic 
literacy questions or unable to communicate in English or Spanish.  Id. 
152 Id. at 13, Figure 2-2. Forty-one percent had intermediate prose literacy, with fifty-six percent at 
basic or below basic.  Forty-eight percent tested at intermediate document literacy, with fifty percent 
showing basic or below basic.  And only twenty percent revealed intermediate quantitative literacy, while 
seventy-eight percent tested at basic or below basic. The study also excludes altogether persons unable to 
communicate in English or Spanish and those with cognitive or mental disabilities that prevented literacy 
testing. Thus, the results may overstate the overall inmate literacy rates. 
153 See Comment, Technological Leaps and Bounds:  Pro Se Prisoner Litigation in the Internet Age, 10 U. 
PENN. J. OF CONST. L. 819, 830-831 (2008) (arguing that constitutional right of access to courts requires internet 
access for legal research, in so doing citing states’ dramatic cuts to prison law libraries post-Lewis v. Casey and 
lack of internet access in all such libraries); Thomas C. O’Bryant, The Great Unobtainable Write:  Indigent Pro 
Se Litigation After the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Symposium:  Pro Se Litigation Ten 
Years After AEDPA, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 299, 319-332 (2006) (describing severely limited legal resources 
available to pro se inmates in Florida, including prison library law clerks generally equipped only with a high 
school diplomas, a GED, or functional literacy and 30 hours of legal training; jailhouse lawyers who are 
prohibited from, and punished for, possessing other inmates’ legal papers; the virtual absence of computers for 
inmate research; and actual library access limited to once a week). 
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pursuit of the writ. 
Statistics regarding the relative mental health of the inmate population 
in the United States are similarly bleak.  A study released by the U.S. 
Department of Justice in 2006 indicated that more than half of all 
individuals incarcerated in this country suffer from mental illness.154  More 
specifically, more than two-fifths (43%) of state prisoners and more than 
half (54%) of jail inmates reported symptoms of mania.155  Approximately 
23% of state inmates and 30% of those in jail reported symptoms of major 
depression.156  Insomnia or hypersomnia and persistent anger were the most 
commonly reported episodes amongst those reporting major depression or 
mania, with nearly half of jail inmates reporting such symptoms.157  About 
15% of state inmates and 24% of jail inmates reported symptoms of a 
psychotic disorder.158  About 74% of state inmates and 76% of those in jail 
with a mental health condition also met criteria for substance dependence or 
abuse.159  Thus, even in the rare event that an inmate is sufficiently 
equipped educationally to read and understand habeas doctrine, his ability 
to do so may be profoundly impaired by mental illness.   
 
F. The Impact Of AEDPA On The Number Of Federal Habeas Petitions 
Being Dismissed On Procedural Grounds And Thus, Failing To Reach 
Merits Review 
 
Empirical study confirms that, since AEDPA’s enactment, for non-
capital litigants the Great Writ has lost much of its muscle.160  A 2007 study 
conducted at Vanderbilt School of Law revealed that federal habeas 
petitioners lacked assistance of counsel in 92.3% of non-capital cases.161  
Moreover, under AEDPA, district courts have dismissed as untimely 22% 
of non-capital federal habeas petitions.162  Of the time-barred petitioners, 
only 5.1% had counsel.163  By contrast, only 4% of capital cases, where 
                                                
154 See DORIS J. JAMES AND LAUREN E. GLAZE, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES (2006), available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf. Mental health problems were defined by either a recent history 
or symptoms of mental illness within the 12 months prior to the study, which was conducted in mid-2005.  But 
inmates in mental hospitals or who were otherwise physically or mentally unable to complete the study surveys 
were excluded. Thus, again, the above statistics likely under-represent the actual levels of mental illness in prisons 
and jails.  Id. at 2. 
155 Id. at 3. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. at 6. 
158 Id. A psychotic disorder is shown by signs of delusions or hallucinations during the prior year.  Id. 
Delusions are indicated by the inmates’ belief that other people were controlling their brain or thoughts, could 
read their mind, or were spying on them.  Id.  Hallucinations included reports of seeing things or hearing voices 
that others did not.  Id. 
159 Id. 
160 See NANCY J. KING, FRED L. CHEESMAN II, AND BRIAN J. OSTROM, FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT: HABEAS 
LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF HABEAS CORPUS CASES FILED BY STATE 
PRISONERS UNDER THE ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996, hereinafter HABEAS 
LITIGATION TECHNICAL REPORT, at 3. 
161 Id. at 23.   
162  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:  HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS, at 6; HABEAS LITIGATION 
TECHNICAL REPORT, at 46, 57.   
163 HABEAS LITIGATION TECHNICAL REPORT, at 46.   
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habeas petitioners have a statutory right to assistance of counsel and thus 
are not required to navigate AEDPA’s procedural requirements alone, were 
dismissed as time-barred.164 The rates of non-capital petition dismissal as 
successive (7%) or individual claim dismissal as procedurally defaulted 
(13%) approximate pre-AEDPA practice.165  But as with the time-barred 
cases, the dismissal rate on successive and default grounds in non-capital 
cases, where petitioners are largely uncounseled, is much higher than in 
capital cases.166  Finally, with respect to the effect of assistance of counsel, 
the report found that the presence of counsel added 11%-49% more time to 
habeas proceedings than in cases where the petitioner lacked counsel.167  
The presence of counsel reduces the likelihood of early termination of 
habeas cases,168 which typically arises with procedural dismissals. 
This data illustrates the devastating effect that the statute of limitations, 
combined with other procedural doctrines, has had on the pro se litigant’s 
ability to obtain federal court review of the merits of claims raised in habeas 
proceedings.169  More than one in five litigants are unable to file within 
AEDPA’s designated one year time period.170  It is unclear what portion of 
these cases involve litigants who simply miss the deadline due to failure of 
calculation or those who are literally unable to file within the year allotted 
to them while also satisfying AEDPA’s exhaustion requirement.  
Regardless, a substantial portion of habeas petitions never clear the 
courthouse doors for substantive review of the claims raised within them.   
As a result of AEDPA’s dramatic effect on the efficacy of the Great 
                                                
164 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:  HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS, at 6; HABEAS LITIGATION 
TECHNICAL REPORT, at 46, 57, 62 (noting “[t]he greater frequency of time-barred cases for non-capital prisoners 
is expected given that unlike death row inmates in most states, non-capital habeas filers navigate the post-
conviction process and its deadlines without counsel”); 28 U.S.C.A. § 2261.  
165 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:  HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS, at 6; HABEAS LITIGATION 
TECHNICAL REPORT, at 58.  Because the study focused only on district court rulings, its authors acknowledge that 
the calculated rate of petition dismissal as successive may understate the actual dismissal rate in light of the 
gatekeeping role the court of appeals now play under AEDPA in authorizing the filing of successive petitions.  Id.  
The report indicates that the cases involving at least one procedurally defaulted claims are also underreported 
because in some cases where the court had alternative bases for denying the petition, it would rule on the merits 
first, and statute of limitations second, and thus never address the procedural default issue.  Id. 
166 The study indicates all claims were dismissed as unexhausted in over ten percent of non-capital cases, as 
compared to less than 4% of capital cases. HABEAS LITIGATION TECHNICAL REPORT, at 62.  Stays for exhaustion 
occurred seven times as often in capital cases than in non-capital cases.  Id.  Procedural default, however, was 
invoked as the basis for dismissing a claim four times as often in capital as in non-capital cases.  Id.  Interestingly, 
post-AEDPA, fewer courts are dismissing petitions on exhaustion grounds.  Id. at 57 (reporting that, prior to 
AEDPA, more than half of all claims raised in non-capital cases were dismissed without prejudice due to the 
petitioner’s failure to exhaust in state court; post-AEDPA, 11% of non-capital cases involve dismissal of claims as 
unexhausted).  This decrease may be attributable to an increasing awareness of the need to exhaust claims – a 
relatively straightforward requirement that does not involve the complex calculations of AEDPA’s statute of 
limitations – and, to a lesser extent, district courts’ post-AEDPA ability to stay and hold in abeyance the 
exhausted claims in a mixed petition, while the petitioner returns to state court to exhaust the remaining claims. 
See id. at 57-58 (reporting that district courts stayed cases to allow a petitioner to exhaust unexhausted claims in 
only 2.5% of non-capital cases and that these stays occurred in less than one-quarter of the districts).   
167 HABEAS LITIGATION TECHNICAL REPORT, at 73.   
168 Id. 
169 See Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Rethinking the Federal Role in State Criminal Justice, 84 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 791 (2009) (citing Vanderbilt study as evidence that federal habeas review of state criminal 
judgments no longer works and thus advocating for abolition of federal review and reallocation of resources to 
improve efficacy of trial court representation). 
170 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:  HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS, at 6; HABEAS LITIGATION 
TECHNICAL REPORT, at 46, 57. 
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Writ for inmates seeking federal postconviction review of their criminal 
judgments, some scholars have called for the abolition of federal habeas 
corpus proceedings altogether, arguing that judicial resources are better 
spent at the front end, providing defendants with competent trial and 
appellate counsel.171 But the dire state of implementation of Gideon’s 
mandate amplifies the critical need for providing counsel in habeas corpus 
proceedings.  With trial and appellate counsel stretched so thin, errors by 
even the most able and diligent of counsel are inevitable.  And the remedy 
provided in habeas may be the only chance the indigent inmate has at 
achieving the constitutional mandate of effective assistance of counsel, 
albeit later in the process than contemplated by the Sixth Amendment.  
Moreover, even if the judiciary had the resources and motivation to amply 
animate Gideon, it is axiomatic that humans err.  There will always be cases 
in which a lawyer’s personal circumstances – physical or emotional issues 
or even a temporary overextension within his/her caseload -- will prevent 
him or her from providing competent representation.   Affected clients are 
entitled to a meaningful remedy.  Recognition of a right to counsel based on 
access to the courts would provide that remedy. 
 
II.   ACCESS-TO-THE-COURTS DOCTRINE  
 
As discussed in the Introduction and Part I, this article argues for 
recognition of a limited right to counsel for habeas litigants to ensure their 
constitutional right of access to the courts.  Pre-AEDPA attempts at 
convincing the Supreme Court to recognize a right to counsel of any 
dimension in state postconviction proceedings were unsuccessful.172  But in 
light of the inordinate complexity AEDPA introduced to federal habeas 
practice and the negative impact it has had on pro se litigants, this article 
urges a revisiting of that precedent to the extent federal courts rely on it 
failing to embrace a right to counsel in federal habeas proceedings.  To do 
so first requires an overview of the contours of access-to-the-courts 
doctrine. 
Justice Harlan once described the access doctrine as fundamental to the 
rule of law in that the rule of law assumes that (1) the law will be enforced; 
and (2) individuals who suffer wrongs under the law will be able to have 
access to the appropriate forum, primarily courts, for enforcement of the 
law.173  The access cases, either explicitly or implicitly, incorporate these 
two assumptions and address measures necessary to ensure that the indigent 
be able to get into court to enforce their legal rights.  The Supreme Court 
                                                
171 See Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Rethinking the Federal Role in State Criminal Justice, 84 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 791 (2009) (citing Vanderbilt study as evidence that federal habeas review of state criminal 
judgments no longer works and thus advocating for abolition of federal review and reallocation of resources to 
improve efficacy of trial court representation). 
172 See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551; Murray v, Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1. 
173 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374-375 (1971) (holding due process of law prohibited state from 
denying indigent access to court for divorce proceedings based on inability to pay court fees and costs).  See also 
Cruz v. Hauck, 475 F.2d 475, 476 (5th Cir. 1973) (describing the right to access the courts as “the fundamental 
right”) (emphasis in original). 
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has recognized an inmate’s constitutional right to gain access to the courts 
to litigate post-conviction and civil rights proceedings.174 
The right of access derives from both equal protection and due process 
jurisprudence, though the Court has not clearly articulated the nature of this 
origin.175  The right, itself emerged from both constitutional challenges to 
procedural requirements that prevent inmates from pursuing post-conviction 
litigation as well as right-to-counsel jurisprudence.176   Today, though still 
fairly ill-defined, the access right requires more than mere passivity on the 
states’ part.  Rather, in certain circumstances the right requires states to take 
affirmative measures to ensure meaningful access to the indigent.  
“Meaningful access to the courts is the touchstone” of the right.177  The 
right has evolved in several stages. 
 
A. Early Access Cases 
 
The Supreme Court first invoked the access-to-the-courts doctrine in 
1941, in Ex Parte Hull,178 to prohibit state action that directly obstructs a 
pro se inmate’s ability to file a postconviction petition.  In Hull, the Court 
held unconstitutional a state prison regulation that authorized prison 
officials to intercept inmate habeas corpus petitions that were thought to be 
improperly prepared.179  The Court concluded: 
 
[T]he state and its officers may not abridge or impair petitioner’s 
right to apply to a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus.  Whether 
a petition for writ of habeas corpus addressed to a federal court is 
properly drawn and what allegations it must contain are questions for 
that court alone to determine.180 
 
                                                
174 See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996). 
175 See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 11, n. 6 (1989) (“The prisoner’s right of access has been described 
as a consequence of the right to due process of law, see Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 . . . (1974), and as an 
aspect of equal protection, see Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557 . . . (1987)). The Court invokes equal 
protection principles in evaluating whether state laws or policies discriminate between the indigent and the 
financially able, see, e.g., Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 709 (1961) (holding that “to interpose any financial 
consideration between an indigent prisoner of the State and his exercise of a state right to sue for his liberty is to 
deny that prisoner the equal protection of the laws”), and due process doctrine in assessing whether state action 
functions to preclude an individual from seeking relief in a judicial forum, see, e.g. Procunier, 416 U.S. at 419 
(declaring invalid “[r]egulations and practices that unjustifiably obstruct the availability of professional 
representation” as violating the corollary to “[t]he constitutional guarantee of due process of law . . . that prisoners 
be afforded access to the courts in order to challenge unlawful convictions and to seek redress for violations of 
their constitutional rights.”).  Often, challenged laws or policies necessarily implicate both doctrines.  See, e.g., 
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (where states provide for statutory right to appeal a criminal conviction, the 
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit erecting any financial barriers 
that might prevent the indigent from appealing, e.g., requiring indigent to purchase trial transcripts). 
176 See, e.g., Boddie, 401 U.S. at 374-75; Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 480-81 (1963); Draper v. 
Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 494 (1963); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 708 (1961); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 
253 (1959); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963); Griffin 
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18-19 (1956). 
177 Bounds, 430 U.S. at 823 (internal quotation omitted). 
178 312 U.S. 546 (1941); see also Bounds, 430 U.S. at 821-22 (recognizing Hull as the advent of the access-
to-the-courts doctrine). 
179 Hull, 312 U.S. 546. 
180 Id. at 549. 
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Almost 30 years later, the Supreme Court held that the access right 
guarantees more than merely the literal right to file documents in court.181  
In Johnson v. Avery, the petitioner challenged a state prison regulation that 
barred inmates from assisting one another in preparation of habeas 
petitions.182  The Court held that, unless the state or some other source 
provides legal help to indigent prisoners, the court cannot indirectly obstruct 
access by preventing jailhouse lawyers from preparing habeas petitions for 
other indigent prisoners.183  The Court underscored that 
 
[s]ince the basic purpose of the writ is to enable those unlawfully 
incarcerated to obtain their freedom, it is fundamental that access of 
prisoners to the courts for the purpose of presenting their complaints 
may not be denied or obstructed.184 
 
Without the assistance of a jailhouse lawyer, the pro se habeas 
petitioner’s possibly valid constitutional claims would never reach a court 
for consideration.185  The Court noted that the problem of access is 
particularly acute for the “high percentage of persons who are totally or 
functionally illiterate, whose educational attainments are slight, and whose 
intelligence is limited.”186  In his concurring opinion, Justice Douglas 
elaborated: 
 
In a community where illiteracy and mental deficiency is notoriously 
high, it is not enough to ask the prisoner to be his own lawyer.  
Without the assistance of fellow prisoners, some meritorious claims 
would never see the light of a courtroom.  In cases where that 
assistance succeeds, it speaks for itself.  And even in cases where it 
fails, it may provide a necessary medium of expression.187 
 
Following Avery, the Court in Younger v. Gilmore upheld in a two-
paragraph per curiam opinion the lower court’s judgment requiring 
California officials to provide indigent inmates with access to a 
reasonably adequate law library for preparation of legal actions.188  
Several years later, the Court unanimously extended Avery to cover 
assistance by fellow inmates in civil rights actions.189  The Court 
rejected the state’s attempt to distinguish the relative importance of civil 
rights actions from habeas petitions, noting that both “both actions serve 
to protect basic constitutional rights.”190  The Court observed: 
                                                
181 See Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969). 
182 Id. at 484. 
183 Id. at 490. 
184 Id. at 485-86. 
185 Id. at 487. 
186 Id.  
187 Id. at 496 (J. Douglas, concurring). 
188 404 U.S. 15 (1971). 
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The right of access to the courts, upon which Avery was premised, is 
founded in the Due Process Clause and assures that no person will be 
denied the opportunity to present to the judiciary allegations 
concerning violations of fundamental constitutional rights. . . . The 
recognition by this Court that prisoners have certain constitutional 
rights which can be protected by civil rights actions would be diluted 
if inmates, often “totally or functionally illiterate,” were unable to 
articulate their complaints to the courts.191 
 
B. Right to Counsel Cases 
 
As the jurisprudence regarding the access-to-the-courts right was 
evolving, the Supreme Court also began to define the parameters of the 
indigent criminal defendant’s right to assistance of counsel.  The right to 
counsel cases, though initially not analyzed in terms of access to the courts, 
echoed the same concepts of fairness and access to justice as the access 
cases.  Indeed, recognizing the similarity in constitutional underpinnings, 
the Supreme Court would eventually fold this jurisprudence into its access-
to-the-courts case law.  Prior to this doctrinal merger, the right to counsel 
jurisprudence developed as follows. 
 
1. Right to Counsel at Trial 
 
In Powell v. Alabama, the Court held the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause and Sixth Amendment require assistance of counsel for 
capital defendants.192  In so holding, Justice Sutherland observed that “[t]he 
right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not 
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.”193  Rather, both the 
“intelligent and educated layman” and the “ignorant and illiterate, or those 
of feeble intellect” “require[] the guiding hand of counsel at every step in 
the proceedings against him.”194 
Six years later, in Johnson v. Zerbst, the Court held that the Sixth 
Amendment requires appointment of counsel at government expense for 
every indigent defendant in federal court who faces loss of life or liberty, 
unless the defendant waives that right.195  In so holding, the Court observed 
that the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel clause  
 
embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average 
defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect 
himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or 
                                                
191 Wolff, 418 U.S. at 579. 
192 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
193 Id. at 68. 
194 Id. at 68-69. 
195 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938). 
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liberty, wherein the prosecution is presented by experienced and 
learned counsel.  That which is simple, orderly, and necessary to the 
lawyer, to the untrained layman may appear intricate, complex, and 
mysterious 196     
 
Similarly, in extending Powell to noncapital defendants in Gideon v. 
Wainright, the Court noted: 
 
[I]n our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into 
court who is too poor to hire a lawyer,  cannot be assured a fair trial 
unless counsel is provided for him.  This seems to us to be an 
obvious truth.197 
 
2. Right to Counsel on Appeal 
 
The right to counsel on direct appeal does not find its origin in the Sixth 
Amendment.  In fact, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that, unlike the 
Sixth Amendment right to trial, a criminal defendant does not have a 
constitutional right to appeal his conviction.198  Instead, the right to direct 
appellate review is entirely a creature of statute.199  Nonetheless, where 
states decide to provide for a statutory right to appeal, the Due Process and 
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit imposing 
any financial barriers that might prevent the indigent from appealing.200   
In Griffin v. Illinois, petitioners challenged a state law that required non-
capital defendants to purchase their own trial transcripts.201  In finding the 
law violated due process and equal protection guarantees, the Court noted 
that, once a state decides to provide for a right to appeal, it cannot do so in a 
way that discriminates against convicted defendants who happen to be 
poor:202 
 
There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets 
depends on the amount of money he has.  Destitute defendants must 
be afforded as adequate appellate review as defendants who have 
money enough to buy transcripts.203 
 
After Griffin, the Court held other financial obstacles to direct appeal 
to violate the Fourteenth Amendment.  These barriers included a state 
                                                
196 See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932);  
197 Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). 
198 Martinez v. Court of Appeal, 528 U.S. 152, 160-61 (2000) (finding no constitutional right to represent 
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law permitting only public defenders to obtain free transcripts of a 
hearing on a coram nobis application,204 which thus denied indigent 
appellants transcripts for appeal unless counsel ordered them;205 a 
requirement that an indigent defendant satisfy the trial judge that his 
appeal has merit before obtaining free transcripts;206 and filing fees to 
process a state habeas petition207 or to seek review from the state 
supreme court.208 
In 1963, the Supreme Court extended the reasoning of Griffin and its 
progeny209 to hold that where a state provides for a right to appeal 
criminal convictions, the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses 
require the state also to provide the indigent appellant with assistance of 
counsel.210  At issue in Douglas was a California law that required 
appellate courts to make a threshold assessment of the merits of an 
appeal before deciding to appoint counsel to assist a defendant on direct 
appeal.211  The Court held that when an indigent appellant must “run 
th[e] gantlet of a preliminary showing of merit, the right to appeal does 
not comport with fair procedure.”212  In such a case, 
 
[t]here is lacking that equality demanded by the Fourteenth 
Amendment where the rich man, who appeals as of right, enjoys the 
benefit of counsel’s examination into the record, research of the law, 
and marshalling of arguments on his behalf, while the indigent, 
already burdened by a preliminary determination that his case is 
without merit, is forced to shift for himself.  The indigent, where the 
record is unclear or the errors are hidden, has only the right to a 
meaningless ritual, while the rich man has a meaningful appeal.213 
 
In 1974, the Supreme Court in Ross v. Moffitt declined to extend 
Douglas to discretionary appeals.214  In so holding, the Court emphasized 
that an indigent appellant seeking the discretionary review of a supreme 
court already has the benefit of attorney work-product from the first appeal, 
which he need only duplicate with a request for high court review.215  Thus, 
although undoubtedly helpful, assistance of counsel is not constitutionally 
required.216  The Court noted: 
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[The state’s constitutional duty] is not to duplicate the legal arsenal 
that may be privately retained by a criminal defendant in a 
continuing effort to reverse his conviction, but only to assure the 
indigent defendant an adequate opportunity to present his claims 
fairly in the context of the State’s appellate process.217 
 
The Court underscored, however, that states must “assure the indigent 
defendant an adequate opportunity to present his claims fairly.”  Id.   
At its core then, the right-to-counsel cases derive from a judicial 
conviction that the courthouse doors will not close to judicial review of 
claims raised by unrepresented inmates simply by virtue of the fact that 
they lack the requisite legal skills to navigate the legal process.  Thus, 
where counsel is essential either to engage in trial advocacy or to frame 
new claims on appeal, the right to counsel attaches.   
 
C.  Bridging Access-to-the-Courts and Right to Counsel Doctrines:  
Bounds v. Smith  
 
In 1977, the Supreme Court formally merged the early access-to-the-
courts cases with its right to counsel jurisprudence to articulate an access 
doctrine of broader application.  In Bounds v. Smith,218 state inmates filed 
civil suit against the state arguing their constitutional right of access to the 
courts required the state to provide adequate prison law library facilities or 
other legal assistance in habeas litigation.219  The Court agreed, holding that 
in some situations the access right places an affirmative obligation on states 
to develop and implement “remedial measures to insure that inmate access 
to the courts is adequate, effective, and meaningful.”220  In so concluding, 
the Court invoked both early access-to-the-courts and right-to-counsel 
precedent.221   
The Court identified the core of its prior decisions striking down 
financial obstacles to the appellate process – including lack of counsel – as 
essential to ensure the indigent access to a meaningful appeal from their 
convictions.222  Justice Marshall, writing for the six-Justice majority, 
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rejected the state’s attempt to limit its reading of Johnson v. Avery223 and 
Wolff v. McDonnell.224  Rather, the majority observed that at issue in those 
cases was whether state policies prohibiting inmates from assisting one 
another in preparing habeas and civil rights actions violated the access 
rights of “ignorant and illiterate” inmates “without adequate 
justification.”225  Because in both cases such inmates were unable to present 
their written claims to the courts, their “constitutional right to help” 
required at minimum permitting assistance from fellow, literate inmates.226  
The Court noted that Johnson and Wolff “did not attempt to set forth the full 
breadth of the right of access.”227  Indeed, neither case precluded requiring 
“additional measures to assure meaningful access to inmates able to present 
their own cases.”228   
The Court further noted that it had long imposed affirmative obligations 
on states to guarantee meaningful court access to all inmates.229  “[T]he cost 
of protecting a constitutional right cannot justify its total denial. . . . [T]he 
inquiry is . . . whether law libraries or other forms of legal assistance are 
needed to give prisoners a reasonably adequate opportunity to present 
claimed violations of fundamental constitutional rights to the courts.”230 
Justice Marshall observed that “it would verge on incompetence” for an 
attorney to file an initial pleading without researching relevant procedural 
and substantive law.231  And if a lawyer must perform such tasks, so, too 
must the pro se inmate.232  Indeed, it is likely even more important that the 
pro se litigant “set forth a nonfrivolous claim meeting all procedural 
prerequisites” to avoid early dismissal.233  Likewise, without an adequate 
library or legal assistance, the pro se litigant is left defenseless to answer to 
the respondent’s pleadings.234  The situation is particularly compelling in 
habeas proceedings, where the petitioner often seeks to raise claims that 
trial or appellate counsel did not litigate and thus, has no legal work product 
off of which to work.235  
But the Court emphasized that states have broad discretion in ensuring 
constitutionally adequate access to the courts for inmates.236  Providing a 
law library is but one means of doing so, and states are encouraged to 
experiment with alternate approaches.237  The relevant inquiry is what steps 
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are necessary “to give prisoners a reasonably adequate opportunity to 
present claimed violations of fundamental constitutional rights to the 
courts.”238  Thus, the Court held:  “[T]he fundamental constitutional right of 
access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the 
preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners 
with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in 
the law.”239 
In so holding, the Court dismissed as “irrelevant” the state practice of 
appointing counsel in postconviction proceedings where the petitioner’s 
claims survive initial judicial review.  Rather, the core concern underlying 
the access right is “protecting the ability of an inmate to prepare a petition 
or complaint,” that is, securing a foot in the courthouse door in the first 
place.240   
In dissent, then-Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger, 
accused the majority of creating “the ‘fundamental constitutional right of 
access to the courts’ . . . virtually out of whole cloth with little or no 
reference to the Constitution from which it is supposed to be derived.”241  
Justice Rehnquist warned that “[i]f ‘meaningful access’ to the courts is to 
include law libraries, there is no convincing reason why it should not also 
include lawyers appointed at the expense of the State.”242  “Just as a library 
may assist some inmates in filing papers which contain more than the bare 
factual allegations of injustice,” the dissent reasoned, “appointment of 
counsel would assure that the legal arguments advanced are made with 
some degree of sophistication.”243 
 
D. The Right of Access, Post-Bounds 
 
In 1987, the Supreme Court rejected petitioner’s claim in Pennsylvania 
v. Finley that the “equal protection guarantee of ‘meaningful access’”  
requires assistance of counsel during state postconviction proceedings.244  
In Finley, the petitioner filed a pro se habeas petition in state trial court, 
raising the issues her appointed counsel had raised on direct appeal to the 
state supreme court.245  The trial court denied relief, but the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court reversed, ordering that petitioner receive assistance of 
counsel in her postconviction proceedings.246  After review of the record, 
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petitioner’s attorney informed the court that there were no arguable bases 
for relief and thus asked to be relieved as counsel.247  The trial court agreed 
with counsel’s assessment and granted the motion to withdraw from 
representation.248    
With new appointed counsel, petitioner appealed the trial court’s 
judgment.249  The state appeals court held that prior counsel had been 
ineffective in moving to withdraw without briefing potential issues as 
required by Anders v. California,250 and remanded for further 
proceedings.251  The Supreme Court reversed, finding Anders inapplicable 
because it derives from a constitutional right to counsel, which does not 
exist in state postconviction proceedings.252  The Court observed that “the 
right to counsel extends to the first appeal of right, and no further.”253  
Moreover, “defendant’s access to the trial record and the appellate briefs 
and opinions provided sufficient tools for the pro se litigant to gain 
meaningful access to courts” for both discretionary appellate review and 
postconviction proceedings.254   
Two years after Finley, the Supreme Court issued a plurality opinion in 
Murray v. Giarratano, holding that petitioners in capital cases do not have 
an access-to-the-courts’ right to counsel in state postconviction 
proceedings.255  In Giarratano, Virginia’s death row inmates filed a civil 
rights suit arguing that assistance of counsel was required in order “to enjoy 
their constitutional right to access to the courts in pursuit of state habeas 
corpus relief,” as guaranteed by Bounds v. Smith.256  State prison facilities 
in Virginia provided death row inmates with restricted use of law libraries 
and appointed a number of staff attorneys to the various penal institutions to 
assist inmates with incarceration-related litigation.257   
The district court concluded that several special considerations 
warranted greater assistance to inmates than outlined in Bounds.258  
Specifically, in light of their pending execution, death row inmates have 
limited time within which to prepare postconviction petitions, their cases 
are exceptionally complex, and the psychological effect of their death 
sentences impairs the ability to perform their own legal work.259  The 
Fourth Circuit, en banc, affirmed the district court’s remedial order.260  In so 
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holding, the appellate court concluded that Pennsylvania v. Finley was not 
controlling because Finley was not a “meaningful access” case, did not 
address the rule enunciated in Bounds v. Smith, and, “most significantly,” 
was not a death penalty case.261 
The Supreme Court reversed, affirming Finley, which, in disagreement 
with the Fourth Circuit, it characterized as in fact involving meaningful 
access to the courts: 
 
The Court of Appeals . . . relied on what it perceived as a tension 
between the rule in Finley and the implication of our decision in 
Bounds v. Smith . . .; we find no such tension.  Whether the right of 
access at issue in Bounds is primarily one of due process or equal 
protection, . . . in either case it rests on a constitutional theory 
considered in Finley.262 
 
Thus, the plurality observed that to interpret Bounds as requiring the 
provision of assistance of counsel to capital inmates would require at least 
partially overruling Finley based on the district court’s factual conclusions 
regarding the unique nature of capital cases.263  Instead, the Court extended 
Finley to capital inmates, in so doing noting that its “holding necessarily 
imposes limits on Bounds.”264 
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice O’Connor, writing separately, 
concurred in the judgment.265  As a threshold matter, he noted: 
 
It cannot be denied that collateral relief proceedings are a central 
part of the review process for prisoners sentenced to death.  As 
Justice Stevens observes [in dissent], a substantial proportion of 
these prisoners succeed in having their death sentences vacated in 
habeas corpus proceedings.  The complexity of our jurisprudence in 
this area, moreover, makes it unlikely that capital defendants will be 
able to file successful petitions for collateral relief without the 
assistance of persons learned in the law.266 
 
But Justice Kennedy also underscored that states have considerable 
discretion in implementing measures that secure meaningful access to the 
courts for its inmates, as required by Bounds.267   And significantly, despite 
the lack of formal provision for appointment of counsel in capital cases, “no 
prisoner on death row in Virginia has been unable to obtain counsel to 
represent him in postconviction proceedings.”268  Additionally, Virginia’s 
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penal institutions employ staff attorneys to assist inmates with 
postconviction pleadings.  Thus, Justice Kennedy concluded that he was 
“not prepared to say that this scheme violates the Constitution.”269 
Seven years after Giarratano, the Supreme Court modified Bounds in 
Lewis v. Casey.270  In Casey, Arizona state inmates brought a civil rights 
action under Bounds v. Smith challenging the adequacy of the state’s prison 
law library and legal assistance program.271  The district court granted 
injunctive relief on the ground that the prison system failed to comply with 
the constitutional standards set forth under Bounds.272 The Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the Bounds violation finding and, for the most part, the terms of 
the injunction.273   
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded due to the district court’s 
“failure to identify anything more than isolated instances of actual 
injury.”274  In so holding, the Court read into Bounds an actual-injury 
requirement.  The Court emphasized that Bounds did not “create an abstract, 
freestanding, right to a law library or legal assistance” and thus, “an inmate 
cannot establish relevant actual injury simply by establishing that his 
prison’s law library or legal assistance program is subpar in some 
theoretical sense.”275  Rather, the Court in Lewis held that, to show a 
violation of the constitutional right to access to the courts, an inmate must 
demonstrate that the prison’s alleged deficient library or legal assistance 
resources “hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim.”276  
 
He might show, for example, that a complaint he prepared was 
dismissed for failure to satisfy some technical requirement which, 
because of deficiencies in the prison’s legal assistance facilities, he 
could not have known.  Or that he had suffered arguably actionable 
harm that he wished to bring before the courts, but was so stymied by 
inadequacies of the law library that he was unable even to file a 
complaint.277 
 
The Court also modified Bounds’s apparent expansion of the right of 
access recognized in earlier cases, “which was a right to bring to court a 
grievance that the inmate wished to present.”278  Specifically, the Court 
disclaimed Bounds’s suggestion that “the State must enable the prisoner to 
discover grievances, and to litigate effectively once in court.”279  The Court 
concluded:  “To demand the conferral of such sophisticated legal 
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capabilities upon a mostly uneducated and indeed largely illiterate prison 
population is effectively to demand permanent provision of counsel, which 
we do not believe the Constitution requires.”280  In short, Lewis made clear 
that the access right is merely the right to get a foot in the courthouse door, 
not a right to substantive assistance with one’s case.281  At the same time, 
the right necessarily implicates a substantive component, which is inherent 
in the right to have access to a law library or other legal assistance.   
After Lewis, the precise parameters of the access-to-the-courts right as 
applied to pro se habeas litigants remain imprecise.  At a minimum, before 
enactment of AEDPA and its concomitant procedural strictures, the 
Supreme Court had declined to hold that the access right encompasses a 
right to assistance of counsel.282  For death row inmates, however, Justice 
Kennedy, with Justice O’Connor joining, premised his vote on the fact that 
no Virginia death row inmate had in fact been denied assistance of 
counsel.283  Hence, the issue is arguably still an open one.284  Instead, the 
Court has adhered to a position that the access right is an inherently flexible 
one, with states possessing broad discretion as to how to implement it.  In 
Lewis, the Court also underscored that the right encompasses only the 
ability to get one’s foot in the courthouse door, rather than in discovering 
and actually litigating claims in a petition.   
But the dramatic change in federal habeas law brought by enactment of 
AEDPA in 1996 changed the relevant legal landscape, and now calls for re-
examination of the issue.  Even for non-capital inmates, AEDPA’s complex 
array of procedural requirements -- in particular, the statute’s one-year 
statute of limitations and its interplay with other procedural doctrine -- have 
placed the Great Writ out of reach for many pro se inmates.  Absent repeal 
of AEDPA, this new landscape, particularly as illuminated by the federal 
courts since AEDPA’s enactment, necessitates recognition of a 
constitutional right to assistance of counsel in deciphering the myriad filing 
requirements and thus, gaining access to federal court review.  
 
 
III.  THE ACCESS TO THE COURTS DEMAND FOR COUNSEL IN POST-AEDPA 
LITIGATION 
 
As discussed, the constitutional right of access to the courts for habeas 
petitioners is still fairly amorphous in dimension. In the absence of 
assistance of counsel, the early cases, Johnson v. Avery285 and Younger v. 
Gilmore,286 note the essential role of jailhouse lawyers and/or adequate law 
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libraries in ensuring access to the courts for indigent habeas petitioners.  
But after AEDPA, such alternate resources no longer suffice to protect the 
indigent inmate’s right to access to the courts.  Fellow inmates self-taught 
in federal habeas corpus are generally no match for the rigor and intricacies 
of AEDPA’s procedural demands.  Nor will access to a prison law library 
without legal assistance enable the average pro se inmate to gain adequate 
insight into AEDPA’s myriad procedural requirements in order to fend for 
himself.   
Likewise, the right-to-counsel jurisprudence, as merged with the access 
right, should not control.  This caselaw contemplates the role of counsel in 
researching and framing the substance of claims in discretionary appeals 
and state habeas proceedings.  The Supreme Court ultimately concluded 
that where inmates are simply repeating claims previously litigated with 
counsel’s assistance, the U.S. Constitution does not demand assistance of 
counsel.287  But none of this jurisprudence considers the barrier to access 
that AEDPA’s inordinate procedural complexity now poses to pro se 
litigants. 
In Bounds v. Smith, the Court identified substantive content to the 
access right, finding its core to be “protecting the ability of an inmate to 
prepare a petition or complaint.” 288  As discussed, with Lewis v. Casey, the 
Supreme Court retreated from this interpretation, holding that “access” 
signifies only the right to get one’s foot in the courthouse door, rather than 
to possess full litigation capability once inside.289  The Court underscored 
the need for states to have flexibility in implementing the right.   
While such flexibility may have sufficed constitutionally to protect 
Lewis’s more limited access right in the pre-AEDPA era, the dramatic 
change to federal habeas practice that AEDPA wrought in 1996 demands  
conferral of a right to counsel to federal habeas litigants.  Indeed, the 
Court’s decision in Lewis contemplates the reality of post-AEDPA habeas 
practice when it posits as an access violation the case where the court 
dismisses a pro se litigant’s petition due to failure to comply with a 
technical requirement that the litigant could not have known about, or 
where the inmate is unable to file for relief altogether as a result of 
inadequate legal resources.290  In Lewis’s era, these hypotheticals bordered 
on the extreme.  But today, federal habeas practice epitomizes these 
examples in that AEDPA’s procedural complexity is all but 
incomprehensible to the average inmate, regardless of the library facilities 
available to the inmate.  The Vanderbilt study finding that 22% of non-
capital petitions are dismissed on timeliness grounds alone, with another 
7% dismissed as successive and 13% of individual claims procedurally 
barred, bears this out. 291  A copy of the statute and federal case reporters, 
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though perhaps sufficient in pre-AEDPA practice, will not begin to unpack 
the intricacies of AEDPA’s myriad requirements for the average pro se 
inmate.  Indeed, federal courts have devoted substantial energy over the 
past fifteen years to distilling the actual mechanics of AEDPA’s procedural 
requirements, in particular, its statute of limitations.  Notwithstanding the 
skill and experience of the federal bench, this process remains a daunting 
one.   
Without a lawyer, in sufficient time, an inmate might be able to 
articulate his core concerns – e.g., “my lawyer didn’t talk to my alibi 
witness” or “the prosecutor didn’t give my lawyer all of the evidence,” – 
and the judge, with a law clerk at hand, can typically figure out the 
underlying constitutional issues presented.292  But once the procedural 
barricade of AEDPA was erected, and pro se inmates were required to 
navigate the intricacies of a short statute of limitations, together with the 
exhaustion and procedural default doctrines and the new bar on successive 
petitions, the courthouse doors in effect slammed shut.  Most inmates, while 
perhaps capable of inartfully informing the court why they think they 
should not be behind bars, are not capable of navigating a very complicated 
set of procedural rules. For these inmates, AEDPA erected an impenetrable 
barrier to habeas review. 
Nor does removal of restrictions on inmates helping one another suffice, 
constitutionally.293  True, in time, some inmates might be able to educate 
themselves to a point at which their knowledge rivals, if not surpasses, 
professional counsel.294  But without systemic provision of competent legal 
assistance or a remedy for the lack thereof, too many inmates will come up 
short, with little correlation in case outcome to the actual merits of their 
cases.  Denial of counsel in modern federal habeas practice is akin to denial 
of access to the jailhouse lawyer and/or an adequate prison law library in 
the pre-AEDPA world. 
Lewis seems to hold that a petitioner can show an access violation only 
after the fact, and only where he was denied review of an arguably valid 
claim.295  This would preclude relief for inmates who are unable to identify 
potentially meritorious claims that they would have raised in a procedurally 
barred habeas petition.  It would also preclude any injunctive relief or 
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provision of counsel before dismissal of a habeas petition.  The Court has 
not shed additional light on this aspect of its decision since Lewis.  But such 
holding stands in direct conflict with access-to-the-courts jurisprudence.  As 
discussed, Bounds merged the decisions that involved literal impediments to 
indigent filing -- e.g., filing fees, prison official screening of petitions, and 
unavailability of trial transcripts to pro se litigants – with the right-to-
counsel jurisprudence, all of which define the right of access as entirely 
independent of the merits of the petitioner’s case.  Rather, the essence of the 
right is merely the ability to present one’s case before the judiciary, 
regardless of the ultimate outcome.  Hence, to the extent Lewis requires 
more, the decision should be overruled as at odds with decades of Supreme 
Court jurisprudence. 
Regardless, after Lewis, it is clear that the right of access at best means a 
right to assistance of counsel in clearing AEDPA’s procedural hurdles to 
federal habeas review.  It does not contemplate assistance of counsel in 
researching and framing those claims.296  Thus, a right to postconviction 
counsel based on access doctrine would extend only to penetrating the 
procedural thicket cultivated by AEDPA, and no farther.    
There are a number of methods that could serve to fulfill this 
constitutional mandate.  Specifically, federal courts could (1) provide 
counsel to assist indigent inmates in navigating AEDPA’s procedural 
requirements and filing the petition within the provided one-year time 
period as well as a remedy where attorney error causes dismissal of a 
petition on procedural grounds; (2) where provision of counsel is 
impractical, simply provide a remedy to petitioners where they fail to 
satisfy AEDPA’S myriad procedural requirements for reasons other than  
lack of due diligence; (3) recognize  ineffective assistance of counsel or 
denial of counsel altogether as a basis for statutory or equitable relief from 
AEDPA’s strictures; or (4) enact policy reforms either to reduce the number 
of inmates pursuing the writ of habeas corpus or to repeal AEDPA’s 
procedural requirements altogether. 
 
A. Providing Counsel 
 
To implement an access right to counsel, the federal government can 
invoke the ready structure of the federal public defenders’ offices and/or 
federal panels for court-appointed counsel.  Indeed, some federal public 
defenders offices already staff attorneys competent in AEDPA’s intricacies 
and pitfalls as a result of capital defense practice.297  As a matter of course, 
inmates whose convictions are affirmed on direct appeal would receive 
consultation with counsel regarding the postconviction process.  If an 
                                                
296 Cf. Garcia Uhrig, supra note 12, at 598 (articulating a substantive, claims-based right to assistance of 
counsel in habeas corpus for claims raised in the first instance in habeas proceedings). 
297 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B) (providing for right to counsel in federal postconviction proceedings); 
18 U.S.C. § 3006A (requiring more stringent experience criteria for counsel appointed in capital postconviction 
proceedings than noncapital proceedings).  
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inmate indicates interest in pursuing postconviction relief, counsel would 
advise him of the procedural requirements under AEDPA.  Counsel would 
also advise state inmates regarding the role state postconviction proceedings 
play in properly exhausting any claims presented in a federal petition and in 
tolling AEDPA’s statute of limitations.  In practice, implementation of the 
right would mimic the constitutional right to counsel on direct appeal, albeit 
counsel’s role would be a more limited one:  to ensure that the inmate is not 
denied habeas review based on failure to comprehend and navigate 
AEDPA’s procedural requirements.     
 
B. Providing a Remedy for Ineffective Assistance of Postconviction 
Counsel 
 
1. The Constitutional Requirement of Effective Assistance of Counsel 
 
It is well-established that the constitutional rights to counsel at trial and 
on direct appeal guarantee rights to effective assistance of counsel.298  
Where counsel renders ineffective assistance, a defendant may seek relief, 
usually in postconviction proceedings, from the consequences of that 
incompetence.  In Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme Court set forth a 
two-part test for establishing constitutionally ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel:  First, the defendant must show that defense counsel acted 
unreasonably, that is, contrary to “prevailing professional norms.”299  
Second, the defendant must show prejudice: that there is a “reasonable 
probability” that the result of the proceeding would have been different if 
defense counsel had performed competently.300  In Evitts v. Lucey, the 
Court recognized that the constitutional right to counsel on direct appeal 
likewise requires effective assistance of counsel, for which the Strickland 
test informs the remedy.301 
Similarly, recognition of a constitutional right to counsel in filing a first 
federal habeas petition would require a remedy for procedural errors that are 
attributable to attorney incompetence or lack of counsel altogether.  Thus, 
where the petitioner demonstrates that counsel’s assistance was 
professionally unreasonable, or altogether denied, and that one or more of 
AEDPA’s procedural hurdles precluded habeas review of his claims as a 
result, he would be entitled to relief.  Such relief could obtain by relieving 
the inmate from the preclusive strictures of the procedural doctrine at issue.  
Thus, for example, the district court would review the substantive claims in 
an otherwise time-barred petition, a procedurally defaulted claim, and/or a 
second or successive petition, containing claim(s) overlooked or excluded 
                                                
298 See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 654 (1984) (describing the Sixth Amendment right to effective 
assistance of counsel); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (setting forth test for establishing 
denial of constitutional right to counsel); Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985) (recognizing due process and 
equal protection right to counsel on direct appeal requires effective assistance of counsel). 
299 466 U.S. 668, 684-85 (1984). 
300 Id. at 692, 694. 
301 469 U.S. at 396. 
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in the first petition due to attorney error or failure to provide assistance of 
counsel altogether.302 
 
2. Statutory and equitable relief from AEDPA’s strictures 
 
a. Relief From The Statute Of Limitations 
 
As discussed, AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations is responsible 
for the majority of the federal habeas petitions that federal courts deny for 
procedural reasons, rather than on the merits.303  Recognition of a right to 
counsel based on access to the courts would mean that, where counsel fails 
to advise an inmate accurately regarding the calculation of the one-year 
period, two doctrines could supply an inmate with relief. 
First, the government’s failure to provide effective assistance of counsel 
would constitute an “impediment to filing” and thus, a basis for statutory 
tolling, under § 2244(d)(1)(B).  Indeed, some federal courts have already 
recognized that a state’s failure to provide an inmate with a copy of the 
federal habeas statute as revised under AEDPA constitutes an impediment 
and therefore justifies statutory tolling of the statute of limitations for the 
period during which the impediment existed.304  Thus, where competent 
counsel is unavailable to assist an inmate in comprehending and navigating 
the statute of limitations within the defined year, the statute of limitations 
would be tolled until the inmate receives this assistance. 
Second, a lack of competent post-conviction counsel could provide a 
basis for equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.  The plight of the pro 
se inmate in filing within the statute of limitations has already found some 
traction in equitable tolling doctrine.  For example, federal courts have 
applied equitable tolling where counsel fails to return petitioner’s file in 
time to enable petitioner to timely file his federal petition305 or where the 
prison library lacks even a copy of AEDPA.306  Most recently, the Supreme 
Court held that extraordinary ineffective assistance of court-appointed post-
conviction counsel, which resulted in a time-barred federal petition in a 
                                                
302 Where attorney error or lack of legal assistance altogether causes omission of a claim from a first § 2254 
petition, thus requiring petitioner to file a second or successive petition, the only relief available would apply 
within an ineffective assistance of counsel framework because the substantive criteria under AEDPA for filing a 
second or successive petition is limited, in relevant part, to claims showing actual innocence.  See 28 U.S.C. § 
2244(b)(2). 
303 See EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:  HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS, at 6; HABEAS LITIGATION 
TECHNICAL REPORT, at 46, 57. 
304 See note 51, supra. As argued in this article, these cases do not go far enough.  Providing a typical inmate 
with a copy of the revised statutes provides at best superficial exposure to an enormously complicated body of 
law, one which has evolved primarily through judicial decisions. 
305 See Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 957-58 (9th Cir. 2010) (remanding for district court to develop facts 
to determine whether equitable tolling appropriate based on habeas counsel’s failure to return case file in time to 
enable petitioner to timely file his § 2254 petition); Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding 
equitable tolling appropriate based on habeas counsel’s failure to file § 2255 petition or return petitioner’s file 
throughout the duration of the limitations period and two months beyond); cf. Ford v. Pliler, 590 F.3d 782, 790 
(9th Cir. 2009) (denying equitable tolling based on counsel’s failure to return case file because petitioner had not 
shown failure caused him to miss the one-year deadline).  
306 See Whalum/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2000). 
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capital case, may justify equitable tolling.307  But thus far, courts have 
declined to apply equitable tolling based on “ordinary” ineffective 
assistance of counsel.308  Recognition of an access-based right to counsel 
would provide a basis for equitable tolling where a petitioner files his 
petition outside the one-year period of time as a result of misapprehension 
of the requirements of the statute of limitations, based in turn on denial of 
counsel or incompetent assistance of counsel.309    
Recognition of an access right to counsel would not offer relief from the 
exhaustion requirement.  But with statutory and equitable tolling available 
based on post-conviction counsel’s error, a state petitioner who fails to 
exhaust all federal claims due to incompetent counsel would remain able to 
return to state court to finish exhausting his claims without being time-
barred from re-filing under AEDPA.  
  
b. Relief From Procedural Default Doctrine 
 
Similarly, even absent a miscarriage of justice, recognition of an access 
right to counsel would enable petitioners to pursue claims that are otherwise 
procedurally defaulted to the extent the default is the result of faulty advice 
by postconviction counsel and would suffer prejudice from the default.310  
As discussed,311 under AEDPA, the procedural default doctrine permits 
review of otherwise defaulted claims where a petitioner can demonstrate 
cause and prejudice or actual innocence.312  The Supreme Court has not 
clearly defined either “cause” or “prejudice.”313  Although the Court has not 
articulated a comprehensive list of circumstances that qualify as “cause,”314 
such event generally must be some “objective factor” external to the 
defense.315  Nonetheless, the Court has recognized as sufficient cause 
situations in which the state impeded or prevented compliance with the 
procedural rule in question316 or where defense counsel error caused the 
default at a stage where petitioner was constitutionally or statutorily entitled 
to effective assistance of counsel.317  Similarly, “cause” to excuse a 
procedural default arises where the state denied petitioner a constitutional or 
                                                
307 See Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549 (2010). 
308 Id. at 2564. 
309 Inmates who miss the deadline as a result only of their own lack of due diligence would not qualify for 
equitable tolling.  See Holland v. Florida,130 S. Ct. 2549, 2562 (2010) (noting equitable tolling applies if 
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311 See text accompanying notes 137-143, supra. 
312 See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991); Wainright v. Sykes, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). 
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314 Id.; Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 534 (1986). 
315 Id.; Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986).  
316 See Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 691-98 (2004) (finding state’s failure to disclose exculpatory 
evidence under Maryland v. Brady qualified as “cause”); Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 283, 289 (1999) 
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statutory right to counsel altogether, thus forcing him to proceed pro so.318  
As such, assuming prejudice, recognition of an access-to-the courts right to 
assistance of counsel in federal habeas proceedings would qualify as 
“cause” to excuse procedural defaults caused by either attorney error or a 
federal habeas petitioner’s pro se status.319 
 
c. Policy-Based Reforms 
 
As anyone who does death penalty work can attest, states have failed 
miserably at providing adequate, effective assistance of counsel to criminal 
defendants at trial and on direct appeal.320 The situation has only grown 
worse with escalating rates of incarceration and nationwide state budget 
crises.  Thus, at least under the criminal justice system as currently 
configured, providing attorneys in all federal post-conviction proceedings 
may well be financially untenable.  But as Justice Marshall observed in 
Bounds v. Smith, “the cost of protecting a constitutional right cannot justify 
its total denial.”321  At least several possibilities exist to enable 
constitutional compliance without public financial ruin. 
First, because inmates must still be “in custody” as well as have 
completed the direct appellate process in order to file a federal habeas 
petition, federal habeas petitioners are typically those serving long 
sentences.  Thus, a good starting point would be to re-evaluate the state 
sentencing codes.  Specifically, states could choose to incarcerate fewer 
people and for shorter periods of time by revisiting the misguided policies 
of the 1980s and 1990s that resulted in the large-scale incarceration of the 
American people.322 This approach would free up resources throughout the 
criminal justice system without compromising its integrity.  
Second, states could simply decline to provide counsel to inmates as 
required under an access doctrine but instead, provide the equitable or 
statutory relief from AEDPA’s procedural strictures as articulated above. 
Lastly, and perhaps most simply, Congress could repeal AEDPA.  
Indeed, I suspect that if the Supreme Court were to recognize an access-
based constitutional right to counsel in light of AEDPA’s procedural 
complexities, repeal of AEDPA’s statute of limitations would quickly 
follow. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In the trial context, the Supreme Court has recognized that “[w]hile a 
criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are expected to enter 
the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice of unarmed 
prisoners to gladiators.”323  What has emerged in federal habeas practice for 
noncapital, pro se litigants is precisely such a slaughter.  In the absence of a 
right to assistance of counsel, the myriad procedural requirements under 
AEDPA render too many pro se litigants helpless in pursuit of the Great 
Writ, effectively denying them their right of access to the courts.  The effect 
of denying assistance of counsel in ascertaining and complying with 
AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations and accompanying procedural 
rules is no less potent an impediment to judicial review than the obstacles 
struck down in the access cases.  Thus, absent the fortuity of competent 
jailhouse counsel, the average pro se inmate lacks an “adequate opportunity 
to present his claims fairly” in federal habeas proceedings.324  Without 
assistance of counsel in navigating through AEDPA’s procedural thicket, 
the pro se petitioner must shoot into the dark at what has revealed itself to 
be an elusive and moving target.  When he misapprehends the strictures of 
AEDPA, the courthouse doors slam shut, with no remedy available to 
reopen them. 
In short, the reality of post-AEDPA habeas practice demands 
recognition of a right to counsel to ensure the indigent litigant’s access to 
the courts.  A right to counsel based on access-to-the-courts doctrine is an 
inherently limited one in that, after Lewis v. Casey, the right of access 
guarantees nothing more than gaining literal entrance through the 
courthouse door.325  Hence, if recognized, such a right would require 
competent legal assistance for indigent inmates in navigating and 
comprehending AEDPA’s procedural requirements, but nothing more.  This 
right, combined with the equal protection and due process right outlined in 
my first article, which would attach to all claims for which habeas corpus 
functions as a first appeal of right, combine to provide the indigent litigant 
with a meaningful opportunity to pursue the Great Writ.  
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